The Causes and Consequences of Political Trust and Satisfaction With Democracy in Eastern Europe by Ceka, Besir
THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF POLITICAL TRUST AND 
SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY IN EASTERN EUROPE 
 
 
 
Besir Ceka 	  	  	  	  
A dissertation submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the 
Department of Political Science. 
 
 
 
 
Chapel Hill 
2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
               Approved by:  
 
             Milada Vachudova 
 
        Liesbet	  Hooghe	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Robert	  Jenkins	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Gary	  Marks	   	   	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Graeme	  Robertson	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   John	  Stephens	   
	   ii	  
	  	  	  	  ABSTRACT	  	  BESIR	  CEKA:	  The Causes and Consequences of Political Trust and Satisfaction With 
Democracy in Eastern Europe (Under	  the	  direction	  of	  Milada	  Vachudova)	  	  	  
In my dissertation, I study the causes and consequences of political trust and satisfaction 
with democracy in Eastern Europe. The extent to which citizens trust key political 
institutions has significant ramifications for their political behavior, for electoral 
dynamics, and for the consolidation of democracy in a country. Three major questions 
about how citizens evaluate the performance of democracy and democratic institutions 
have shaped my research: (1) the causes of political trust; (2) the effect of media 
exposure on political attitudes; and (3) the political behavior of dissatisfied citizens. 
Thus, I investigate the main factors that explain political trust and satisfaction with 
democracy and then explore the consequences of such political attitudes for electoral 
behavior. 
 My findings suggest that the intensity of political competition—and the extent to 
which opposition parties criticize, and expose the misdeeds of the government—has a 
significant effect on trust in political institutions. I also find that exposure to foreign 
owned media, which rely on sensationalist coverage, depresses political trust and 
satisfaction with democracy. The opposite is the case for state-owned media because 
most state-owned media in Eastern Europe are controlled by the governing parties of the 
day and, thus, the news coverage tends to be more positive and focuses less on the 
	   iii	  
failures and more on the achievements of the government. As for the effect of political 
attitudes on electoral behavior, I find that citizens who do not trust key political 
institutions are less likely to be civically active and turn out to vote. If they do vote, 
however, I show that dissatisfied citizens are far more likely to vote for extreme 
nationalist and radical left parties than for other more moderate non-mainstream parties.  
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The Perils of Political Competition: Explaining Participation and Trust in Political 
Parties in Eastern Europe 
	  
The democratization process in central and eastern Europe has been one of the 
greatest success stories of the Third Wave of democratization. Many post-communist 
countries, especially those that have already joined the European Union (EU), have 
established stable and durable democratic institutions and well-functioning market-based 
economies, which have significantly improved the living standards of their citizens. At 
the same time, recent research has shown that eastern Europeans are dissatisfied with the 
way democracy works in their countries, and exhibit alarming levels of distrust of the 
major political institutions (Rose, 2009; Pop-Eleches and Tucker, forthcoming). Even 
more intriguing are findings that show that the most highly rated postcommunist 
democracies have the most distrustful citizens (Pop-Eleches and Tucker, forthcoming; 
Klingemann, Fuchs, Zielonka, 2006). 
What explains these findings? And what are the consequences of such high levels 
of distrust in political institutions for the democratic process and for political 
participation? The existing research identifies these puzzles, but does not provide 
satisfactory answers. The goal of this article is to introduce a theoretical framework that 
explains the high levels of distrust in one key democratic institution, political parties, and 
to explore its effects.  
I demonstrate that in post-communist Europe vibrant political competition has 
come with a high price tag: it has led to disillusionment with the political system and has 
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stifled direct political participation by citizens. I take a bottom up approach and analyze 
survey data to identify the individual and country level factors that determine trust in 
political parties and the likelihood of political participation at the individual level. The 
results point in one direction: the postcommunist polities that experienced vibrant 
political competition in their electoral arenas also witnessed the highest levels of 
disillusionment with political parties and, consequently, with the political system. This, I 
argue, is mainly due to the communist legacy of the one-party system and the 
opportunities for rent-seeking unleashed by the closing down of centrally planned 
economies. Decades of monopolization of the electoral arena by communist parties left 
East Europeans ill prepared to appreciate vigorous political competition—especially as it 
exposed a parade of economic and other scandals. Depending on its intensity and the 
vigor with which parties exposed corrupt dealings, competition tended to depress trust in 
political parties as an institution and, consequently, stifled direct political participation.  
The causal story I tell involves several steps. The basic argument runs as follows: 
Intense political competition and, in particular, vocal and critical opposition parties that 
criticize and expose government scandals do much to convince the average Eastern 
European that political parties are deeply corrupt institutions run by self-interested and 
power-hungry politicians. Mishandlings of the privatization process provide much of the 
ammunition for the opposition which, when coupled with a political culture of distrust 
and apathy, tends to further erode trust in political parties. This distrust, I argue, has had 
the overall effect of depressing direct political participation as disillusioned citizens have 
tended to withdraw from public life. However, some of the disillusioned have been an 
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electoral boon for some new and unorthodox parties that have been able to mobilize them 
(Pop-Eleches, 2010). 
I also demonstrate that there is an interaction effect between partisanship and 
competition in explaining trust in parties. More specifically, competition has the effect of 
reducing trust in parties only for those individuals who have weak or no party 
identification. For intense partisans, vigorous political competition has no effect on their 
trust of political parties as an institution.  
While the main empirical section of this paper primarily uses cross-sectional data 
from a particular wave of surveys conducted in Eastern Europe between 1997 and 2001, 
my theoretical framework has dynamic implications as well.  My theory suggests that as 
time passes and as individuals are able to form party attachments, the effect of 
competition on trust in parties should fade away. Furthermore, as the economic transition 
draws to a close and as new generations of East Europeans are socialized into democratic 
norms and rules, the communist legacies should matter less. Thus, the relationship 
between competition and trust should be further weakened. Therefore, in the final section 
of this article, I investigate trends over time and offer some preliminary evidence in 
support of the dynamic predictions of my theory. 
The rest is organized in five sections. First, I discuss the relevant strands of 
literature that deal with political competition, participation, and trust. Second, I discuss 
the measures I use for the main variables of interest. Third, I describe the methods used 
and discuss the findings. Fourth, I trace trends in political trust and party identification 
over time. The final section concludes with the implications of my findings.  
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1. Political	  competition,	  trust	  and	  participation	  
The quality of political competition assumes a central position in our 
understanding of democracy. The competitiveness of the electoral arena has become the 
predominant yardstick against which scholars of transitology have classified and 
evaluated the democratic progress of regimes in transition (Diamond, 2002). This section 
discusses the literature that has grappled with different conceptions and measures of 
political competition and why it is important.  
First, many scholars have examined the role of political competition in deepening 
democracy in fledgling democracies by focusing on alternation of power and the strength 
of the opposition (Vachudova, 2005; Wright, 2008). For these scholars, the alternation of 
power between ruling parties and the opposition is a strong indicator of a competitive 
electoral arena. Others have used the ideological distance (i.e. ideological polarization) 
between the major ruling and opposition parties to measure competition (Frye, 2002). 
The logic for using this measure is that ideologically distant parties are more likely to 
serve as greater checks on their opponents than are parties with closer ideological 
orientations. Thus, polarization provides the checks and balances that produce political 
accountability. Some scholars have criticized this and other measures as static 
(Grzymala-Busse, 2006). For example Grzymala-Busse (2006) argues that our measures 
need to capture the robustness of political competition by focusing on the dynamic 
interaction between parties.  
 My conceptualization of political competition is in line with Grzymala-Busse 
(2006). Given that one of the main roles of opposition parties is to act as “watchdogs” 
and hold the opposition accountable, measures of competition need to reflect the activity 
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and behavior of parties. I am primarily interested in analyzing the effect of vocal, and 
critical political competition on trust and participation. As such, my operationalization of 
competition, which I discuss later, taps into the robustness of political competition. 
 Why do we care about political competition? What evidence do we have that 
more competition does in fact lead to better democratic outcomes? Some of the early 
work on this topic suggests that there is a strong link between political competition and 
public policy (Schattschneider, 1942; Key, 1949). Specifically, this literature argues that 
higher political competition leads politicians and parties to distribute public goods more. 
More recent work has established that the sooner a country establishes a competitive 
political arena the quicker it sheds its authoritarian past (Vachudova, 2005; Grzymala-
Busse, 2006; Wright, 2008; O’Dwyer, 2004). Vachudova (2005) argues that political 
competition is crucial in explaining the different trajectories that countries followed after 
the fall of communism. The countries that had strong opposition movements prior to 
1989 had better chances of electing liberal leaders during the first democratic elections 
and of institutionalizing a competitive political system. For Vachudova, the main virtue 
of political competition is that it limits rent-seeking by exposing politicians to greater 
scrutiny (Vachudova, 2005). Others, most notably Wright (2008), have looked into the 
effect of political competition on regime stability. Using pooled data for over ninety 
countries, Wright shows that democracies with low levels of initial competition tend to 
fail because they face anti-system forces, which seek to ascend to power through 
extrajudicial means.  
This may all be true, but scholars have neglected to investigate the impact that 
competition has on citizens’ trust and political participation. I show below that it 
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depresses both. Many authors have explored the importance of trust in democratic 
institutions for democratic consolidation (e.g. Schmitter, 1994). One observation that has 
been validated by comparative research is that trust in political institutions, especially 
trust in political parties, is significantly lower in Eastern Europe compared to both 
Western Europe and other new democracies of the Third Wave (Catterberg and Moreno, 
2005; Rose, 2009).  
 What does the literature have to say about the determinants of support for 
democracy and its institutions? Herbert Kitschelt (1992), for example, makes a forceful 
case for the connection between market success and mass support for democracy in 
Eastern and Central Europe. However, the prediction that economic performance will 
largely determine support for democracy and its institutions has been only partially 
validated. For example, Evans and Whitefield (1995) find that political factors are more 
important in explaining commitment to democracy than economic performance. In fact, 
when they look at the link between GDP per capita levels and support for democracy, 
they find that the poorest three countries exhibit the most support for democracy, the 
opposite of what Kitschelt (1992) predicted. This is consistent with my theoretical model. 
Generally speaking, poorer countries in post-communist Europe lacked vibrant party 
competition and the citizens of these countries were less likely to become disillusioned 
with political institutions as a result of competition. 
Political participation has likewise been extensively studied. While there is much 
dispute about global trends in participation, there is one striking regularity that emerges 
in virtually every study that compares postcommunist Europe to the rest of the world: 
Eastern Europeans are less likely to participate in the public sphere, however 
	  	  
7	  
participation is operationalized (Rose, 2006, 2009; Howard, 2003; Inglehart and 
Catterberg 2002). Furthermore, there is rich variation in the levels of participation across 
the postcommunist world. Why are the Poles, the Estonians, and the Slovenians some of 
the most skeptical and disengaged democrats in Europe while their countries are 
considered to be the region’s democratic and economic frontrunners? This paper is about 
answering this puzzle and, in the following section, I sketch my theoretical framework 
and offer a causal story that links political competition to direct political participation. 
2. Theories	  and	  Hypothesis	  
The main theoretical argument of this paper is that vibrant political competition 
has had the effect of eroding public trust in postcommunist democratic institutions, 
particularly in political parties—and this has negatively affected political participation. 
This, I argue, is caused primarily by two factors that are unique to post-communism: the 
communist legacy of distrust and the economic transition. Decades of communist party 
hegemony had left Eastern Europeans deeply distrustful of political parties and ill-
prepared to appreciate vigorous political competition. Depending on its intensity, 
competition has tended to depress trust in political parties as an institution and, 
consequently, stifle political participation. 
There are three causal stories in this argument. First, I argue that competition 
tends to depress trust in parties. Second, I argue that this is the case only for those 
individuals who have weak or no party identification. Competition does not affect the 
level of trust that strong partisans have in political parties. In other words, political 
competition interacts with partisanship. Third, lack of trust in political parties stifles 
direct political participation as disillusioned citizens tend to withdraw from public life. I 
	  	  
8	  
now turn to each building block of this theoretical model and give a more detailed 
account of the causal mechanisms at play.  
2.1 The effect of competition on trust 
 First, how does competition depress trust in political parties as an institution? The 
mechanism that causally links these two variables is a psychological one. Fierce electoral 
competition and, in particular, vocal and critical opposition parties that expose 
government misdoings do much to convince the average Eastern European that political 
parties are fundamentally corrupt institutions. As Levi and Stoker (2000) have pointed 
out, one trusts politicians and political institutions to the extent that there is no evidence 
to the contrary. Consequently, the more vigilant and scrutinizing the political parties are 
of one another the more one hears about corruption, incompetence, and failure. In short, 
the logic of political survival and competition leads political parties and individual 
politicians to exaggerate the failures of their opponents and this creates an impression of 
severe social, economic, and political disorder for the average citizen. 
The economic transformation that occurred in postcommunist Europe played a 
crucial role in galvanizing pre-existing cynicism towards the political. The transition 
from command economies to market based ones that started right after the fall of 
communism created spectacular opportunities for rent-seeking behavior and state capture 
(Hellman, 1998; Ganev, 2007). During this rent-seeking bonanza, politicians could divvy 
up public property among friends and cronies, dole out construction contracts to 
companies they partly owned, and engage in myriad other forms of corruption. This, in 
many cases, led to sensational and widely publicized corruption scandals.  
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Before we discuss specific cases of corruption and show how they lowered trust 
in political institutions, it is important to note that, at least theoretically, the extent to 
which ruling elites were involved in corrupt practices is not necessarily reflected in the 
number of scandals that were exposed and publicized. In fact, in countries such as 
Poland, Estonia, and Slovenia ruling elites were far less abusive of state resources 
precisely because of the fierce political opposition they faced (Grzymala-Busse 2007). 
This has been indicated consistently by third party corruption measures, such as the 
Transparency International Corruption index.  However, survey data from the 1990s and 
2000s shows that the citizens of these three countries have been consistently the most 
distrustful of political parties, with over 90 percent of the respondents indicating that they 
have very little or no trust in them (Rose, 2009).  
There is little doubt that the extent to which elites have engaged in corrupt 
practices has varied. What matters, and this is the crux of my argument, is that the 
scandalization of corruption cases was most pronounced in those countries where vigilant 
and critical opposition parties were able to expose government abuse. As Grzymala-
Busse (2006: 283) suggests, “a critical opposition constantly monitors and publicizes the 
misdeeds of the government, criticizing its actions in parliament, questioning its 
motivations, and turning also to media channels to voice criticism.”  
The paradoxical case of Slovenia is particularly instructive:  it is widely 
considered one of the least corrupt in the region, yet it is home to some of its most 
distrustful citizens.  The authors of a report on corruption and anti-corruption policy in 
Slovenia by the Open Society Institute (2002) conclude that despite “statistics on criminal 
proceedings and the opinions of analysts and international organisations including the 
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European Union [indicating] that corruption is not a serious problem in Slovenia… 
citizens’ perceptions are that corruption is both widespread and increasing.” When asked 
in 1997, only 1.2 percent of the Slovenian respondents reported that they had personally 
been victims of corruption1. Yet, in a survey conducted in 1999 by the Slovenian Institute 
of Social Sciences, over 62 percent of the respondents believed that corruption in 
Slovenia is on the rise and 38 percent believed that ‘almost all or the majority of public 
officials’ were involved in some form of corruption (OSI, 2002: 578). This clearly 
suggests that the alarmingly high levels of perceived corruption, and the consequent low 
levels of trust in political institutions, are not borne out of personal experience with 
corruption or based on objective third party measures of corruption.  
Why do Slovenian citizens have so little trust in public officials?  Slovenian 
political expert Drago Zajic explains that Slovenians had unrealistically high hopes for 
democracy after the fall of communism. What they got from pluralistic politics was inter-
party quarrelling and criticism, and a constant questioning of the intentions, legitimacy 
and truthfulness of politicians2. Slovenian civil society activist Dejan Savic concurred, 
adding that average citizens have come to distrust the government and the political 
parties that run it because the heavy criticism levied against them has convinced many 
“that it must be true that politicians and their parties are either incompetent or corrupt.”3  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 This data is reported in the OSI (2002) report and is taken from the International Crime Victim Survey 
(ICVS), which is an international comparative crime survey dealing with 11 types of crimes.   
2 Personal communication in Ljubljana, Slovenia on September 8, 2011. 
3 Personal communication in Ljubljana, Slovenia on September 7, 2011. 
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To be fair, Slovenia and its political establishment have been rocked by a number 
of corruption scandals over the years.4 However, corruption and state-capture was, by all 
accounts, far more endemic in Bulgaria, for example; yet Bulgarians exhibit the highest 
levels of trust in parties in the survey data analyzed here. My theory explains these 
puzzling findings in terms of substantial information failures on the part of the citizens 
and their inability to compare the relative democratic and economic progress of their 
countries. Despite more widespread corruption in Bulgaria, the lack of powerful 
opposition forces with resources and political skill to expose and scandalize corruption 
cases has resulted in Bulgarians being more trusting of political parties than Slovenes! 
In fact, if one considers the Corruption Perception Index by Transparency 
International to be a reasonable measure of the actual levels of corruption in a country, 
bivariate correlation analysis shows that there is no relationship between trust in parties 
and actual levels of corruption (Pearson’s correlation coefficient is -0.08)5.  However, the 
correlation coefficients between Trust in Parties and the two measures of political 
competition I use below are relatively high. Specifically, the Effective Number of Parties 
and Trust in parties are highly correlated at 0.61. Similarly, Closeness of Elections is 
correlated to trust in parties with a coefficient of 0.46 (higher values of Closeness 
indicate less competitive elections). 
But why would citizens be disappointed with political parties, rather than with the 
individual actors involved in corruption, ranging from party officials to would-be 
oligarchs to well-connected nomenklatura beneficiaries? The answer is that political 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 See the OSI (2002) report for a discussion of a number of corruption scandals. 
5 Higher scores of the CPI indicate less corruption.  
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parties are the institutions through which politicians run for office, implement policies 
once in office and, in many cases, individual politicians see parties as vehicles for their 
self-enrichment. Furthermore, voters vote for parties during elections and not for 
individual politicians. Thus, politicians do not operate independently of their parties; their 
actions, including corruption, reflect upon the parties that allow them to exercise power. 
As Enyedi and Toka  (2007: 8) have argued, “The initial reservation against parties can 
be explained in terms of the communist legacy, but the various scandals surrounding 
party politics have certainly strengthened negative stereotypes concerning the actual 
motives of party politicians.” Numerous privatization-related scandals “generated much 
cynicism about the moral integrity of …political parties in general (Enyedi and Toka, 
2007: 9).”  
Why does the communist legacy of one-party rule play such an important role in 
determining how post-communist citizens regard parties? My main claim here is that 
nowhere else were political parties as hated and political involvement as tainted. Unlike 
parties in other authoritarian regimes, the communist parties of Eastern Europe managed 
to transform the institution of the political party into an anathema for millions of Eastern 
Europeans.  For decades, many saw the Communist party as an incompetent, and corrupt 
institution that served the interests of the nomenklatura. Political persecutions, dismal 
living standards, and empty propaganda left many questioning the moral integrity of the 
Communist parties in the region. 
The Communist party-states gave rise to what Vaclav Havel has called the 
“politics of anti-politics (Rose, 2009) and led György Konrád, the famous Hungarian 
novelist and dissident, to claim that, ”We ought to depoliticize our lives, free them from 
	  	  
13	  
politics as from some contagious infection. We ought to free our simple everyday affairs 
from considerations of politics…So I describe the democratic opposition as not a political 
but antipolitical opposition, since its essential activity is to work for destatification 
(Stokes, 1996: 180).6” Thus, given these deep-seated anti-party sentiments, some parties 
that ran in the first few elections avoided calling themselves parties. As the Czech Civic 
Forum famously put it during the 1990 elections “Parties are for party members, Civic 
Forum is for everybody” (Kopecky 2001). 
2.2 Party identification as a conditioning factor 
However, not all Eastern Europeans hate or distrust political parties as an 
institution. In fact, I argue that the effect of competition on trust in parties depends on 
how closely an individual identifies with a party, and this is the second causal claim of 
my theoretical framework. How does partisanship mitigate the link between competition 
and trust? The key here is that the partisan brain is a biased brain. Whenever an 
individual with strong emotional attachments to a party is confronted with contradictory 
evidence suggesting that, say, his party is involved in corrupt dealings, he is unlikely to 
be impartial in evaluating such claims. Thus, he will be less likely to lose trust in his own 
party and consequently in political parties as an institution. The effect of such allegations 
is different for someone who has no emotional stake in any of the parties involved in the 
supposed corrupt dealings. Such an individual is more likely to be objective about the 
facts presented and thus more likely to reinforce her negative prejudices against parties 
(Westen, 2007). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 This is an excerpt from Konrad’s essay titled “Antipolitics” that he wrote in 1984 and which has been 
reprinted in Stokes “From Stalinsim to pluralism: a docmunetary history of Eastern Europe since 1945.”  
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2.3 The consequences of political trust for participation 
Third, I argue that distrust in political parties is directly linked to lower political 
participation. If one is convinced that parties are corrupt institutions that serve the 
interests of party leaders at the expense of the public, he will be less likely to turn out and 
vote or work for a party. In other words, if political parties are not seen as aggregators of 
societal interests, as our theories usually assume, and are instead considered to be in the 
business of rent-seeking and state capture, political participation will be lower.  
 Distrust, however, can also spur people to mobilize for other parties7. The extent 
to which disillusioned voters can be mobilized to vote instead of withdrawing completely 
from the political process is an empirical question. Theoretically, some disillusioned 
voters will shop around instead of simply resigning from politics. In fact, there is 
evidence to suggest that disillusioned voters in Eastern Europe switch from one party to 
another and, when they run out of mainstream parties, they vote for unorthodox parties 
(Pop-Eleches, 2010). The regression results presented later in this paper are in line with 
this finding.  On average, distrustful voters are less likely to vote than those who trust 
parties, but some of them present an electoral opportunity for different parties. 
Controlling for relevant factors, however, these distrustful voters are very unlikely to go 
to work for a party.  
Having laid out my theoretical framework, I now proceed to discuss the measures 
I use for my key dependent and independent variables8. 
3. Measuring	  Political	  Competition,	  Participation,	  and	  Partisanship	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 I thank an anonymous reviewer for this insight. 
8A detailed description of all the variables used in this article is available upon request. 
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As discussed above, we find many different operationalizations of political competition 
in the literature. For the regression analyses here, I use two measures of political 
competition: the effective number of parties (ENP) and the Closeness of Elections.  The 
effective number of parties (ENP) that manage to win seats in parliament serves as a 
proxy for party behavior (Laakso and Taagepera, 1979).9 Laakso 
and Taagepera introduced this measure to count parties that win seats in elections and to 
weigh them by their relative legislative strength. The mathematical formula used to 
calculate the ENP is the following: 
 
Where n is number of all parties competing in the electoral contest, and  the square of 
each party’s proportion of all the seats in the parliament.  This measure systematically 
distinguishes important parties from smaller and less significant ones. Given that the 
proportion of the seats that each party wins is squared in the measure, bigger parties 
count more than smaller parties. This measure of political competition is particularly 
suitable because it directly taps into the intensity of competition and the activity of parties 
by measuring both the number and strength of parties in parliament. So, higher ENP 
scores would indicate that the electoral system is more competitive and that several 
significant opposition parties have won seats in the parliament, thus increasing the heat 
and scrutiny that the ruling party or parties receive from the opposition.10 In using this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 The actual calculations were done by Michael Gallagher and are available on his website at: 
http://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/Staff/michael_gallagher/ElSystems/Docts/ElectionIndices.pdf. 
10 Since turnout in the last parliamentary elections is one of the main variables I am trying to explain, I used 
the ENP measure for the elections that the respondents were asked about. The election years for which the 
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measure I implicitly assume that the presence of a larger number of strong parties in 
parliament gives greater opportunities to opposition parties to be vocal and critical of the 
government by asking questions in parliament, and bringing media attention to corruption 
scandals and economic failures. Based on this measure, Bulgaria is the least competitive 
country in the sample, with a score of 2.52, while Slovenia is the most competitive one 
with an ENP score of 5.53. 
 However, the ENP measure has its limitations. It cannot capture intense 
competition in systems that, due to the electoral rules, are dominated by two parties (e.g. 
the Westminster system).  Here two powerful parties can be very effective critics of one 
another. Fortunately, none of the cases included in the regression analyses has a purely 
majoritarian electoral system, limiting the bias that the ENP measure introduces in my 
analysis.  
 Nonetheless, as a robustness check, I constructed an additional measure of 
political competition, the Closeness of Elections, to test my main hypotheses. I use the 
Comparative Data Set for 28 Post-Communist Countries, 1989–2004, by Armingeon and 
Careja (2007) to calculate the difference in the share of votes received by the two largest 
parties in an election. The logic is that closer elections should be more contentious and 
harder fought than elections won in a landslide. The regressions results using Closeness 
as the main independent variable yield similar results, and provide support for my main 
hypotheses that competition decreases political trust.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
ENP measure was constructed were: Bulgaria: 1997; Czech Republic: 1998; Estonia: 1999; Hungary: 1995; 
Latvia: 1995; Lithuania: 2000; Poland: 1997; Romania: 1996; Slovakia: 1998; Slovenia: 1996. 
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Due to space limitations, the results using this additional measure are available upon 
request. 
 Scholars have used numerous indicators of political participation ranging from the 
most conventional, such as voting, to more unconventional ones such as signing petitions, 
protesting, or boycotting (Rose, 2006). In this paper, I use survey11 questions that ask 
people whether (1) they have voted in the last parliamentary elections, and (2) how 
frequently they work for political parties.  These two measures are appropriate because 
they measure both the most frequent form of participation (voting) and a more sustained 
and long-term form of participation that taps into the grassroots support of parties 
(working for a party). Although participating in the latter activity probably increases in 
the run up to elections, the time that people spend working for parties is an indicator of 
more sustained political activism that goes beyond voting on Election Day.  Finally, for 
party identification I use a measure that taps into the intensity of party ID with the 
options being no party ID, not very close, fairly close, and very close to a party.  
3.1 Controls for trust in parties 
In the next two subsections, I discuss some alternative explanations that scholars 
have found to determine trust and participation. The relevant hypotheses are included as 
controls in the regression analyses.  
Many have argued that interpersonal trust is an indicator of human capital, which 
is positively related to trust in political institutions. As Catterberg and Moreno have 
found, (2005: 44) “Individuals who generally trust in other people express higher 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Consolidation of Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe 1990-2001. Cumulative Data from a fifteen 
country study in 1997-2001 and the 1990-92 Post-Communist Publics Study in eleven countries 
coordinated by Edeltraud Roller, Dieter Fuchs, Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Bernhard Wessels (Social 
Science Research Center Berlin, WZB), and János Simon (Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest). 
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confidence in political institutions.”  Some individuals might be more or less skeptical by 
nature, and their trust for other people (e.g. neighbors and coworkers) should predict trust 
in political institutions as well. Thus, I include two controls for interpersonal trust: trust 
in neighbors and trust in coworkers.  Furthermore, if one believes that parties only serve 
the interests of their leaders then one is less likely to trust in parties. I control for this by 
including a variable that asked respondents whether they agreed with the statement that 
“parties only serve their leaders’ interests.” 
 As I discussed earlier, some have argued that support for democratic institutions 
in Eastern Europe will depend on economic experience during the transition period 
(Kitschelt, 1992; Przeworski, 1991). To control for this, I include a variable that 
measures how well-off individual respondents are.  Furthermore, satisfaction with 
democracy as a system should be related to trust in its institutions as well as political 
participation.  I therefore include a variable that measures on a scale from 1 (totally 
dissatisfied) to 10 (totally satisfied) the extent to which the respondent is happy with the 
way democracy works in the country. Trust in parties might also depend on how exposed 
one is to media. Given that corruption allegations and other negative information that 
tends to erode trust in parties comes from the media, people that spend more time reading 
newspapers should be more distrustful of parties than people who do not read as much. I 
also control for a set of socio-economic and demographic variables such as income, 
gender, sex, and size of community. 
 As far as country level variables are concerned, I include Freedom House 
(Nations in Transit) democracy scores to control for democratic consolidation and 
internalization of democratic values. I also include Freedom of Press scores and 
	  	  
19	  
Independence of Media ratings to control for the role that professional and independent 
media play in uncovering and exposing corruption cases. Again, a freer and more 
independent media should be associated with lower levels of trust in parties. Furthermore, 
I include a measure of income inequality, the Gini coefficient, from Solt’s (2009) dataset. 
The expectation here is that citizens living in societies with greater inequality should 
have lower levels of trust in political institutions (Anderson and Singer, 2008). To control 
for political culture (i.e. religious traditions), I include a dummy variable (Catholic) that 
takes the value of 1 if 50 percent or more of the population identify themselves as 
Catholic. To code this variable, I used data from the CIA’s World Factbook. Finally, the 
existing literature has found that highly proportional electoral systems are characterized 
with higher levels of political trust than systems that are mixed (Marien, 2012). Thus, I 
include a dummy variable for electoral rules based on Armingeon and Careja’s (2007) 
dataset on political institutions. This variable takes a value of 1 if a country has a pure or 
modified PR system and it takes a value of 0 if parliamentary seats are allocated using a 
mix of PR and majoritarian rules. Only Hungary and Lithuania fall in the latter category.	  
3.2 Controls for Political Participation 
Almost two centuries ago, Alexis de Tocqueville (2000 [1835]) claimed that civic 
engagement in voluntary organizations leads to direct political participation. 
Tocqueville’s theory postulates that as members of civic organizations have face-to-face 
contact with other members they learn to care more about the wider world and develop 
certain civic skills, which induces political efficacy. Putnam (1993, 2000) and others 
have espoused this view of civic associations as “schools of democracy” and have found 
Tocqueville’s theory to be supported by evidence. I operationalize social capital as the 
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total number of organizational memberships per person. Furthermore, interest in politics 
should be positively associated with participation. I control for this factor by including a 
variable that asks respondents about how often they discuss politics with others.  
Furthermore, Inglehart (1997) has found that individuals that hold post-materialist 
values such as self-expression and gender equality as opposed to materialist values of 
economic and physical security are more likely to be civic minded and politically active. 
I run confirmatory factor analysis12 on several questions that tap into post-materialist 
values, and use the predicted scores to construct a Post-Materialist Index. Many previous 
studies have shown that more educated individuals that have higher incomes and live in 
smaller territorial units are more likely to participate. I include control variables for all 
these factors. In addition, age is found to be positively related to participation as older 
people have more time on their hands to participate. Others have found gender to be 
important in predicting both political and nonpolitical participation, with men being more 
likely to participate than women (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995).  
Having introduced the theoretical argument and empirical expectations, along 
with several alternative hypotheses identified by the existing literature, I now turn to 
statistical analysis in order to better understand the link between political competition and 
political participation in Eastern Europe.  
Before I discuss the results, I need to say a few words about the statistical 
methods I employ in my analysis. I use hierarchical logistic models with random effects13 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Only one factor emerges with an eigenvalue greater than 1 (1.03647 in our case), indicating that the 
predicted factor taps into one dimension only—post-materialism.  
13 Here I follow Gelman and Hill’s (2007) recommendation to use random effects for multilevel modeling.  
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that utilize both individual level data (e.g. sex or age) and aggregate data (e.g. country 
measures for political competition). Single level models such as multivariate linear and 
logistic regression are valuable methods for establishing causal relationships and are 
widely used in our field. However, many populations of interest in political science have 
a multi-level structure. For example, when analyzing survey data such as ours, we might 
be interested in both individual factors and country level factors that explain a certain 
outcome (Gelman and Hill, 2007). If we choose a single-level analysis, we are not 
utilizing all the information we have in estimating our models.  It is important to note that 
my dataset has a total of 10 groups, in our case countries, for which I estimate second 
level effects. While this might seem like a low number of groups, Gelman and Hill 
(2007), for instance, have argued, that “even with only one or two groups in the data… 
multilevel models can be useful for making predictions (p. 276).”  
I use survey data for my regression analysis. The “Consolidation of Democracy in 
Central and Eastern Europe 1990-2001” comprises an excellent set of surveys that 
provides a wealth of information about Eastern European attitudes towards democracy 
and participation. Due to better data availability, I use surveys from the second Wave 
(1997-2001) of this study.14 These surveys are suitable for conducting comparative 
analyses because the questions asked are theoretically motivated and nuanced enough to 
allow for more sophisticated tests. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Here are the countries and the dates of the surveys: Bulgaria: 1999; Czech Republic: February 2001; 
Estonia: November to December 2001; Hungary: May 1999; Latvia: September 1998; Lithuania: 
September 2001; Poland: March 2000; Romania: March to May 1998; Slovakia: February 2001; Slovenia: 
May to September 1999. With the exception of the ENP measure, ach of the country-level indicators 
corresponds to the year in which the survey was conducted in a particular country. The election years for 
which the ENP measure was constructed were: Bulgaria: 1997; Czech Republic: 1998; Estonia: 1999; 
Hungary: 1995; Latvia: 1995; Lithuania: 2000; Poland: 1997; Romania: 1996; Slovakia: 1998; Slovenia: 
1996.  
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4.1 How does political competition affect trust in parties? 
 The main theoretical claim of this paper is that competition depresses trust in 
parties. But this effect is conditional on the intensity of party identification. Therefore, I 
now turn to regression analysis and test whether there is an interaction effect between 
competition and party identification in determining trust in political parties15. To test for 
this interaction effect I construct four dummy variables using information from the Party 
ID variable. Each variable corresponds to the intensity of partisanship that ranges from no 
party identification to very close identification, with the base being no party 
identification. I then interact each of these dummy variables with the measure for 
competition. Below is the table with the regression results.  
The results strongly support the hypothesis that the effect of competition on trust 
in political parties depends on the intensity of party identification. As hypothesized, this 
effect is observed only for those who identify very closely with a political party.  As we 
can see from the coefficients of Comp*Not very close and Comp*Fairly close, the effect 
that competition has on trust for parties for people with weak or fairly weak party 
identification is statistically indistinguishable from the same effect for those in the base 
category with no party identification. In other words, given the highly significant 
coefficient of the Competition variable, political competition tends to depress trust in 
parties equally for all individuals who either identify weakly with parties or do not 
identify with them at all.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 The dependent variable in this regression is dichotomous measure of trust in parties, which was coded as 
1 if people indicated that they trust parties either totally or to a certain point, and was coded 0 if people said 
that they had little or no trust at all in parties.  
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 However competition does not affect the extent to which those who identify very 
closely with a party trust parties. The slope representing the effect of competition on trust 
for strong partisans is statistically indistinguishable from zero. This interaction effect 
becomes even clearer if one looks at the graphs in Figure 1.1 below 
Theses graphs plot the predicted marginal probabilities of trust in parties for the 
whole range of the ENP index for people with different levels of party identification. 
Figure 1.1 is striking in that, in the lowest right graph, the solid line that corresponds to 
those who identify very closely to parties is flat, suggesting that political competition has 
no effect on the probability of trust in political parties for intense partisans. As predicted, 
logistic curves for all other categories are downward sloping indicating that as 
competition increases, the probability of trusting parties goes down. In substantive terms, 
controlling for the effect of all other variables in the regression, a one unit increase in the 
EFN index is associated with an approximately 10.5 percent decrease in the probability of 
trusting parties for all but the very intense partisans. In sum, there is strong evidence 
suggesting that intense partisans are immune to the negative effects of competition on 
trust in parties. For those who do not identify very closely with a party, however, 
competition tends to depress trust in this political institution. In all four graphs, the dotted 
flat line represents the average percent of people who claim to trust parties, and the 
dashed lines around the curves represent 95% Confidence Intervals.  
It is important to note that the weak partisans are by far the biggest group. In fact, 
over 60 percent of the respondents in the second wave of surveys suggested that they 
have no party affiliation. Strong partisans, for whom intense competition does not depress 
trust in parties, make up only 5.65 percent of the respondents. Furthermore, around 25 
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percent indicated that they are not very close to any party, and 9 percent said that they 
were fairly close to a party.    
 The regression output suggests some other interesting findings. Contrary to what I 
hypothesized, more exposure to media, measured by how often one reads about politics 
in newspapers (Newspaper), is associated with more trust in political parties. There might 
be some selection bias in this variable as disillusioned citizens might be less likely to read 
about politics than, say, political partisans. However, the Freedom of press variable is 
negatively related to trust, confirming that a more independent media with greater 
capacity to expose scandals does depress political trust.  As hypothesized, higher 
satisfaction with democracy is positively related with higher trust in parties, as indicated 
by the coefficient of Dem. Satisfaction. This result suggests that the more one is satisfied 
with the general functioning of democracy, the more likely she is to trust its core 
institutions.  
 Furthermore, the highly significant coefficients on the two variables measuring 
inter-personal trust suggest that people who are more trusting of coworkers and neighbors 
are also more trusting of parties. Therefore, the evidence indicates that there might be 
some individual characteristics that make some people generally less trusting than others. 
As far as demographic variables are concerned, I am surprised to find that age is 
positively and statistically significantly related to trust in parties: one might have 
assumed that the more time an individual spent living during communism, the less he 
would trust parties. One creative interpretation of this result might be that, given that 
older voters are more likely to show up and vote on Election Day, they are also more 
likely to form attachments to parties, which tends to increase trust in parties. 
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Unsurprisingly, the belief that parties serve only the interests of their leaders, measured 
by the Self-interested variable, lowers the probability of trust in parties and this variable 
is highly significant and has the largest substantive effect on the dependent variable.  
 Regarding country-level variables, besides Competition and Freedom of press, 
income inequality is also related to trust in parties, but contrary to what one would 
expect: countries with more unequal distribution of income have higher levels of trust in 
parties. However, this result becomes less puzzling if one considers Hellman’s 
(1998:234) finding that “post-communist systems with a higher level of political 
participation and competition have been able to adopt and maintain more comprehensive 
economic reforms” and have experienced the slowest growth in income inequality. In 
contrast, in partial and slow reforming countries a small number of people – unhampered 
by strong political competition – have amassed fabulous fortunes at the expense of the 
society; these countries have also experienced the highest increase in inequality. These 
are the same countries whose citizens, as my analysis has shown, have exhibited greater 
levels of political trust than the citizens of countries with more competition. Thus, the 
positive relationship between income inequality and trust is consistent with the existing 
literature that emphasizes the exceptional nature of post-communist transition and 
politics.   
4.2 How does trust in parties affect direct political participation? 
 So far, my empirical analysis has shown that increased competition tends to 
depress trust in parties only for those who are not intense partisans. I now proceed to 
show the final causal relationship between trust in parties and direct political participation 
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to complete the testing of the entire theoretical framework. Table 1.2 reveals some 
interesting results.   
The most significant pattern that can be inferred from this table is that trust in 
parties is positively related to both forms of direct political participation. Although the 
effect that trust in parties has on voting is substantially lower than the effect it has on 
working for a party, both coefficients are significant at the 0.05 level. We are pretty 
confident that the more a person trusts parties, the more likely they are to vote or work 
for parties.  For example, trusting parties somewhat as opposed to little corresponds to a 
13 percent increase in the probability of working for a party and to an approximately 3 
percent increase in the probability of voting. The fact that lower levels of trust in parties 
have a substantially smaller effect on voting is most likely due to the fact that some 
disillusioned voters can still be persuaded to vote. Further research is needed to establish 
this link more convincingly.   
 Unsurprisingly, interest in politics is positively related to participation. People 
who talk more about politics are more likely both to vote and to work for a party. 
Membership in civil society organizations is positively related to both voting and 
working for parties, but its coefficient is only significant for work for parties. Putnam’s 
claim that civil society organizations act as “schools of democracy” is at least partially 
supported by the regression results. Interestingly, post-materialists are more likely to vote 
but less likely to work for parties. The coefficient of the Post-Materialism variable is 
significant in both regressions. One interpretation of this contradictory finding is that, 
given that post-materialism is associated with challenging authority, people that hold 
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post-materialist values are less likely to work for parties because they tend to be 
hierarchically structured.  
As we expected, party identification is positively related to voting and working 
for a party. Democratic satisfaction is positively related to voting only. From the socio-
economic variables only income is consistently and positively related to participation. 
Wealthier people are both more likely to show up at voting booths and get involved in 
more sustained political activity by working for parties. Older people are more likely to 
vote but age does not seem to affect one’s likelihood of working for parties. Also, people 
living in smaller communities are more likely to vote and work for parties than those 
living in bigger communities. One interpretation of this finding is that trust networks and 
civil society organization are denser and more personalized in smaller communities, 
leading to higher rates of participation (Putnam, 1993).  
Trends	  over	  time	  	  
The surveys I have analyzed so far were conducted a decade ago. What has 
happened in Eastern Europe since then? I do not have space to marshal definitive 
evidence, but important indicators point to an increase in trust in political parties. For 
example, evidence from the European Social Surveys (ESS) suggests that, by 2008, 
levels of trust in countries such as Slovenia, Slovakia and Estonia had become as high as 
or higher than in Western Europe. Hungary is the exception to this trend (see Figure 1.2).  
Interestingly, survey data (ESS 2004 and ESS 2008) on party identification from a 
select number of Eastern European countries also seems to suggest that Hungary is the 
only country where there has been a drop between 2000 and 2008 in the percentage of 
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respondents who claim to feel very close or fairly close to a political party.16 There is 
little doubt that these trends can be explained by a 2006 political scandal that rocked 
Hungary, revealing that Prime Minister Gyurcsány had admitted in a speech that he and 
his party had been lying to the public for years in order to remain in power. 
 To return to the broader picture, it seems that, as my theory would predict, an 
increase in party identification has been accompanied by an increase in trust in parties in 
Eastern Europe. Among the EU’s postcommunist members included in my analysis, 
political competition has certainly not gone down either. This preliminary evidence 
suggests that the negative effect of competition on trust in parties may be fading away. 
There are several possible explanations. First, 20 years have passed and, as new 
generations of Eastern Europeans are socialized into democratic norms and rules, the 
communist legacy of distrust in parties may be losing its salience. Second, the economic 
transition has worked itself out and the privatization process is drawing to a close, 
providing fewer opportunities for spectacular self-enrichment on the part of party leaders 
and limiting the number of scandals. More research is needed to explore the link between 
political competition and democratic support in a more dynamic fashion. 
Conclusion	  
 In this article I have shown that in post-communist Europe, at least for the first ten 
years, the effects of political competition have been to depress direct political 
participation by the citizens. What are the implications of this argument? First and 
foremost, it offers a more complete understanding of the factors driving disillusionment 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 More specifically, there was a 10 percent drop in the number of respondents who indicated that they feel 
very close or fairly close to a party.  
	  	  
29	  
with political life in postcommunist Europe.  It also offers a systematic way of thinking 
through puzzling findings that show low levels of support for democracy and its 
institutions in the very countries that have been the democratic and institutional front-
runners of the transition. Where does this leave us? Do we need to rethink our theories of 
political competition? I would say not. There is little doubt that competition has been 
tremendously beneficial for postcommunist societies: it has constrained rent-seeking by 
government officials; it has prompted better governance; and it has improved economic 
performance. My hope is that this article helps explain the political apathy of certain East 
European citizens that so many comparative politics scholars and other informed 
observers have noted and found puzzling. Finally, and the evidence for this is 
inconclusive, it may well be that East Europeans are becoming more accustomed to the 
adversarial nature of democratic politics, and more comfortable with political parties as 
an institution. 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1.1. ESTIMATION RESULTS: TRUST IN PARTIES 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error 
Competition -0.420*** (0.1) 
Comp*Not very close -0.100 (0.2) 
Comp*Fairly close  0.098 (0.1) 
Comp*Very close  0.400** (0.2) 
Electoral System -0.030 (0.2) 
Gini Coefficient  0.063** (0.03) 
Catholic -0.260 (0.4) 
Independence of Media  0.250 (0.4) 
Freedom of Press -0.076** (0.04) 
NIT Democracy  0.420 (0.4) 
Self-interested -0.740*** (0.09) 
Not very close  0.460 (0.8) 
Fairly close  0.220 (0.4) 
Very close -0.380 (0.7) 
Newspaper  0.099** (0.04) 
Dem. Satisfaction  0.210*** (0.02) 
Size of community -0.042 (0.03) 
Trust-neighbors  0.480*** (0.06) 
Trust-coworkers  0.590*** (0.07) 
Income  0.074*** (0.03) 
Age  0.008*** (0.003) 
Sex -0.150* (0.08) 
Constant -0.900 (1.6) 
   
Observations  6128  
   
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 1.2. ESTIMATION RESULTS: VOTING AND WORKING FOR PARTY 
  
 Voted in last parliamentary elections Work for Party 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error              Coefficient   Std. Error 
Trust Parties  0.110** (0.050)  0.523*** (0.058) 
Membership  0.010 (0.039)  0.324*** (0.041) 
Post-materialism  0.123*** (0.045) -0.178*** (0.060) 
Party ID  0.534*** (0.039)  0.384*** (0.042) 
Discuss  0.347*** (0.038)  0.748*** (0.055) 
Dem. Satisfaction  0.076*** (0.018) -0.015 (0.021) 
Size of community -0.188*** (0.022) -0.082*** (0.028) 
Education  0.379*** (0.058)  0.195*** (0.074) 
Income  0.070*** (0.022)  0.070** (0.028) 
Age   0.029*** (0.002) -0.001 (0.003) 
Sex -0.030 (0.066)  0.133 (0.085) 
Constant  0.352 (0.398)  0.332 (0.381) 
   
Observations                         6814 6941 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Figure 1.1. MARGINAL EFFECTS OF COMPETITION ON TRUST BY PARTY ID 
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Figure 1.2. TRUST IN PARTIES OVER TIME 
 
Sources: European Social Surveys (ESS), round 2 and round 4 
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Malaise or Virtuous Circle? Media ownership, political trust and satisfaction with 
democracy in Eastern Europe 
 
 
More than two decades have passed since the collapse of communist regimes in Europe 
and we have seen different paths away from communism, but no common path towards 
liberal democracy. While certain countries have made much more progress than others 
(i.e. the ten East Central European states that have joined the European Union), imperfect 
and fragile democratic institutions are widespread in the entire post-communist world. 
 One such institution is the free media. The transformation of the media has 
followed broader societal change and has closely mirrored the extent to which the 
political system has moved away from authoritarianism. The struggle to create free and 
independent media outlets has been a difficult one, not least so because politicians 
understand the importance of media in shaping public opinion and acquiring political 
power. Thus, a partially free media environment marked by widespread political 
interference in the scope and content of media coverage has been a key feature of the 
transition. The role of media in shaping political attitudes in Eastern Europe has remained 
understudied, however, despite the media’s recognized potential to greatly influence 
peoples’ orientations and beliefs.  
 Moreover, no study has systematically explored how media ownership affects the 
content and framing of news and consequently political attitudes. Foreign ownership of 
media has been a striking feature of the media landscape in post-communist Europe with 
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multinational media conglomerates such as the News Corporation, Axel Springer, and 
Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung (WAZ) being key players in the new media markets of 
this region. Do foreign media report differently than locally owned ones? Does exposure 
to foreign media matter for public opinion? The presence of foreign-owned media in the 
media markets of Eastern Europe has been understudied because it has largely been seen 
as a sign of progress, bringing greater diversity and competition along with much needed 
foreign direct investment. Surprisingly, the foreign-owned media may undermine 
democracy in some ways even as it diversifies the media landscape. 
 In this paper I introduce a theory about the effects of media exposure on political 
attitudes based on the ownership of different television media. Does exposure to media 
lead to cynicism and apathy or does it reinforce political interest and knowledge? I 
explore whether the media has played a role in fueling the widespread disenchantment 
with democracy in Eastern Europe as evidenced in many studies. Here I investigate 
whether the frequency with which people follow news, both in broadcast and print 
(television and newspapers), leads to higher levels of trust in key political institutions and 
support for democracy.  The results suggest that while newspaper readership is positively 
related to a host of indicators of political trust and satisfaction, exposure to television 
does not have the same straightforward effect.  
 Next, I argue that the effect of media exposure on attitudes depends on the 
ownership structure of the media outlets. Specifically, I argue that more exposure to state 
owned TV media increases the level of political trust and satisfaction with the political 
system. The logic here is that the closer the ties between governing parties and the media, 
the less critical the news will be. Thus, people who are exposed to such media outlets will 
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be less likely to be cynical of political institutions (i.e. video-malaise). In other words, 
given that most state-owned media are controlled by the governing parties of the day, the 
news coverage will tend to be more positive and focus less on the failures and more on 
the achievements of the government.  
 In contrast, if media outlets are owned by foreigners, the news coverage will be 
more negative and sensational, thus fueling political distrust. One might expect that the 
entry of foreign-owned media in the markets and the professionalism they bring would be 
good for the media environment –and good for democracy more generally.  Surprisingly, 
this is highly debatable. First, the content of foreign media tends to be negative, 
sensationalist, and shallow.  Second, such content undermines political trust and 
satisfaction with democracy, which we know depresses participation (Ceka, 2013). 
Finally, the content and the tone of news coverage in media that are neither state owned 
nor foreign dominated is hard to predict a priori, because of the unpredictable alliances 
between the owners of such media and political actors. I elaborate more on this in the 
theory section. 
 The countries included in the core analysis include the ten Eastern European 
members of the EU plus Croatia and Macedonia. To test the hypothesis advanced in this 
paper, I rely on multi-level modeling. This paper contributes to theory building in 
comparative politics by painting a more nuanced picture of the media landscape and 
proposing a theory about the effect of ownership of media on political attitudes. It speaks 
to the diverging literatures that find contradictory effects of media exposure on attitudes 
and provides a more complete understanding of the conditional effect of media on public 
opinion. Empirically, this paper relies on several kinds of data, including an original 
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dataset I have constructed with the ownership structure of the main television outlets in 
12 countries in Eastern Europe, to test the empirical implications of the theory. Thus, this 
paper takes an innovative approach by matching the ownership data for TV stations with 
individual level exposure to such media. I now turn to the literature on the effect of media 
on public opinion. 
Video malaise or virtuous circle? 
 
Two broad positions emerge from the large body of work that has studied the relationship 
between media coverage and political engagement. Some scholars have argued that the 
media has a negative impact on public perception, while others have argued that the 
media has a positive impact on political attitudes.  Lang & Lang (1966) were the first 
ones to make a connection between the proliferation of news outlets in the U.S. and the 
rising tide of political disenchantment witnessed in the 1960s. However, it was Robinson 
(1976) who popularized the term “video-malaise” (also media malaise), to emphasize the 
fact that exposure to television news and not to newspapers was related to political 
disaffection.  Since then, theories of video-malaise have dominated the literature, 
especially in the United States, but also in other parts of the world (see for e.g. Patterson, 
1993; 2002; Moy & Pfau, 2000; Nye, Zelikow & King, 1997; Putnam, 2000).  
 A related strand of literature emphasizes the tone of media coverage of political 
events for political dissatisfaction. The argument put forth by this literature draws 
attention to the negative effect of watchdog journalism and the tendency to scandalize 
corruption in public life (Garment, 1991). Content analyses of news media have shown 
that negative reporting has increased over time. For example, Kepplinger (2000) finds 
that the image of political elites in Germany has been in decline since the 1960s and that 
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this is partly due to the increasingly negative press coverage of politicians’ qualities (i.e. 
honesty, credibility, and integrity) and their competency (i.e. poor decision-making 
capabilities and knowledgeability).  
 The literature on media malaise is an important one but the causal mechanisms 
are not always clear and accounts of what causes this ‘malaise’ vary (Norris, 2000; 
Comstock & Scharrer, 2005). Some scholars emphasize structural factors such as market 
pressures that move news media down-market. Others blame the tendency of media to 
frame politicians as greedy and pursuing their self-interest and not as running on 
principles or the desire to serve the public. The horse-race metaphors and the 
corresponding jargon that dominates discourse on Presidential races in the US, but also in 
other places, has tainted the image of politicians (e.g. frontrunner, field of candidates, 
down to the wire, black horse etc.). Add to this the growth of political campaigning and 
the accompanying spin-doctors, pollsters, campaign consultants, and the image of a race 
or a strategic game between calculating and self-interested politicians is firmly cemented 
in the public consciousness (Norris, 2000). 
 The European literature on media malaise tends to emphasize the demise of 
public-service broadcasting and the rise of commercial channels, which emphasize the 
more sensational and negative aspects of political news (Schulz, 1997, 1998). Similarly, 
scholars have voiced widespread concern about the ‘tabloidization’ and ‘infotainment’ 
(i.e. Sun and Der Bild) that has occurred in print media as a result of competition (Norris, 
2000).   
 The most persuasive empirical accounts of media malaise come from 
experimental studies. Robinson (1976) conducted an experiment in which 212 subjects 
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were shown a controversial documentary, The selling of Pentagon, and found that 
political efficacy, or the belief that one can influence public affairs, decreased as a result 
of seeing this particular documentary. Similarly, Ansolabehere & Iyengar (1995) showed 
that negative news decreases voter turnout and political efficacy in the United States. 
Other experimental studies, however, found that exposure to negative news did not 
damage party support while positive news tended to bolster it (Norris et al. 1999). Recent 
research has shown that levels of sophistication and prior attitudinal orientations such as 
party identification greatly condition the extent to which negative coverage increases 
disaffection (Lau & Rovner, 2009; Westen, 2007).  
 Some authors have suggested differentiated effects based on the source of news. 
For example, Robinson (1974) found that those who watched television news had lower 
political efficacy, higher social distrust, and weaker party identification than those who 
get their political news from newspapers, radios, and magazines. Similarly, research has 
shown that use of magazines and newspapers is associated with more favorable opinions 
about public institutions while exposure to network news is associated with less favorable 
evaluations of such institutions (Moy & Pfau, 2000). Thus, some have argued that the rise 
of television has seen a fall in newspaper readership, which historically has been a strong 
predictor of civic participation (Putnam, 1995; 1996). 
 While plausible, the key insights coming from this line of thought have been 
heavily criticized on both theoretical and empirical basis. Norris (2000; 2011) has been 
one of the most forceful proponents of the “virtuous circle” theory that suggests that 
people who show greater interest in politics and have higher levels of sophistication tend 
to seek out political news coverage. Thus higher exposure to media through more 
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frequent watching of TV news, or the habitual use of newspapers and the Internet, 
reinforces practical knowledge, political trust, and civic activism. Others have shown that 
negative coverage of politically relevant social issues energizes political participation by 
raising awareness and drawing attention to important problems (Martin, 2008).  
 Most of the research on the effects of media on political attitudes and behavior 
has been conducted within the U.S. It is still unclear whether the patterns found in the 
U.S. apply to other political contexts. Among other things, there are marked differences 
between the media market in the U.S. and elsewhere. Thus, as Norris (2000) has 
persuasively argued, our best strategy is to do comparative work that overcomes the 
national and time limitations of prior research.  
 More generally, mass media plays an important role in any society. Its power to 
influence and fundamentally shape public opinion and behavior inspires awe and fear. 
How has the existing research conceptualized the role of media in a democratic society? I 
now turn to the research that explores this question. 
 
Media and politics 
 
Norris (2000: 23) situates the role of media within a wider, Schumpeterian tradition of 
thinking about representative democracy, which is characterized by pluralistic 
competition, participation by citizens, and civil and political liberties. Based on this 
framework, media play three crucial roles:  (1) they act as a civic forum for pluralistic 
debate, (2) they serve as a watchdog for civil and political liberties, and (3) they act as a 
mobilizing agent for public participation.  
 Media as a civic forum is based on Habermas’s influential idea that a public 
sphere provides for discussion of public affairs in a civic society (Habermas, 1984, 1998). 
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Habermas was very critical of the rise of the popular press, and the concentration of 
ownership of media outlets because he feared that such developments would shift the 
debate from the “real” sphere to the “virtual” one. However, media have today become a 
civic forum where different voices can be heard that facilitates communication between 
voters and representatives. Even in the context of Eastern Europe, where vested economic 
and political interests tightly control media, the media’s function as a public forum is still 
important. In fact, Gross (2002: 148-9) has gone so far as to claim that, “[t]he highly 
politicized, pluralistic, opinionated and judgmental journalism with neither shared 
standards nor a professional, democratic-minded culture that prevails in Eastern Europe 
not only represents civil society, but is civil society.” 
 One of the more prominent roles of media is to act a watchdog and protect the 
public interest. According to this conception, media should scrutinize those in power and 
hold them accountable for their actions. Investigative journalism plays a crucial role here 
as it bears the promise of exposing corruption, corporate scandals, and government 
failures. Some have argued that the media have taken their watchdog role to the extreme 
and that the widespread public disaffection in the U.S. and Western Europe is partly due 
to the overzealous media (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997). As I discuss in the theory section, 
in the case of Eastern Europe, the role of the watchdog is highly dependent on the 
ownership structure of the specific media outlets and the economic interests they are 
beholden to. In cases with high political control of media outlets, media can act as 
overzealous ‘watchdogs’ for the rival political group but as ‘lapdogs’ for the favored 
party. More generally, research has shown that the tighter the government control on 
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media is the more likely that media will play a lapdog role and not a watchdog one 
(Whitten-Woodring, 2009). 
 Finally, media can act as mobilizing agents by increasing political knowledge and 
interest, which has a positive impact on voting and civic activism. The extent to which 
media plays this role is hotly contested and there is little agreement on the literature about 
the empirical foundations of this argument. The findings are contradictory and context-
specific, implying that for some people exposure to media increases political interest and 
activism, while for others it depresses them because of what Mann and Ornstein (1994: 1) 
has called “corrosive cynicism.”  
 Whether media can successfully fulfill the three roles discussed above is largely 
dependent on the societal forces that compete for media access and control. As Siebert, 
Peterson, & Schramm (1956: 1-2) remarked more than half a century ago, “the press 
always takes on the form and coloration of the social and political structures within which 
it operates. Especially, it reflects the system of social control whereby the relations of 
individuals and institutions are adjusted.” Therefore, I now turn to extant theories about 
the link between media and politics.  
 In a highly influential and widely cited study, Hallin & Mancini (2004) propose 
three models of media and politics: the Liberal Model (Britain, Ireland, and North 
America), the Democratic Corporatist Model (northern continental Europe), and the 
Polarized Pluralist Model (Mediterranean countries of Southern Europe). The authors 
claim that four dimensions are crucial for mapping out different media systems: (1) the 
development of the mass circulation press, (2) political parallelism or the links between 
media and political parties, (3) journalistic professionalism, and (4) the degree of state 
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intervention in media. Here I focus on the last three dimensions because they are 
particularly helpful for thinking through media systems in Eastern Europe. 
 The concept of political parallelism provides a useful starting point for analyzing 
the media landscape in Eastern Europe. According to Hallin & Mancini (2004: 27) 
“political parallelism” refers to the “the extent to which the structure of the media system 
paralleled that of the party system” (p. 27). It can be manifested through media content 
and close links between the two worlds, politically active journalists and media-owners, 
partisanship of the media audiences, and journalistic role orientations or basic 
professional identities (i.e. impartial provider of information vs. opinion leader).  
 The economic vulnerability of media in Eastern Europe provides an opportunity 
for political and business interests to have a great influence over this sector. One of the 
key ways through which such interests influence media is by buttressing unprofitable but 
non-bankrupt media (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2013). More generally speaking, advertising and 
market pressures do not seem to drive the editorial policies of many outlets because they 
are financially supported by business interest closely tied to the different political blocs. 
Such media are thus protected from competition. Advertising, to the extent that such 
media rely on them at all, tend to come from businesses that are politically aligned with 
the different parties regardless of readership or viewership (Hrvatin, Kučić, & Petković, 
2004). 
 In this sense, political parallelism is a widespread phenomenon in the region 
(Mungiu-Pippidi, 2013). Different political interests control or at least influence parts of 
the media landscape and are thus able to exert tremendous influence. As Mungiu-Pippidi 
(2013: 41) puts it, “a good media investment can make a minister or an MP, as well as 
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unseat one”. The outcome of this alarming situation is that, “captured media outlets 
emerge to trade influence and manipulate information rather than inform the public. (p. 
41)” 
 When it comes to influencing media, one group of political actors has a clear 
advantage over its competitors at any given point. Namely, governing parties have more 
resources because of state-capture or the business interests that support them, and thus are 
better positioned to “buy” influence. For example, governments subsidize friendly media 
by channeling state advertising funds or, in some cases, EU funds to those outlets that 
take a pro-government stance (Štětka, 2011: 5)  
 Material resources are not the only way through which governments controls 
media. As Hallin & Mancini (2013:24) remind us, “it is important to keep in mind that 
state inaction is often itself a form of political intervention, as politicians support media 
enterprises politically aligned with them by exempting them from legal regulation.” By 
the same token, media deemed to be unfriendly or downright opposed to the governing 
parties might suddenly become subject to strict application of existing laws. The fate of 
the A1 TV in Macedonia, the largest privately owned TV station in the country, is a 
prime example.  This TV station was eventually shut down in 2011 because the owner, 
and other key people in the organization, were indicted of tax fraud. What provoked the 
wrath of the government? Scathing criticism of the ruling VMRO-DMPNE party and 
clear bias towards the largest opposition party. It is important to note that, by all 
accounts, the owner of A1 was in fact guilty of the crime he was charged with. But, so 
are other businessmen in Macedonia. Tax evasion is widespread in this country but the 
law is applied selectively to punish media outlets that are critical of the government 
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(Igric, n.d.). This brings to mind the memorable quote by Brazil’s one time president 
Getulio Vargas who once said "For my friends, anything - for my enemies, the law” 
(Plummer, 2005). 
 However, in a crucial departure from the Western model of political parallelism, 
where the leaning of the different media is steady,1 the links between the media and 
political parties are more fleeting in the East. In the West, political cleavages run deeper 
and the media have distinct political identifications that are easily discernable and that 
remain stable over time (Hallin & Mancini, 2004). In the East, there is much more 
electoral volatility and parties have far shallower roots in the society, which has hindered 
the establishment of stable links between particular media outlets and parties. 
Furthermore, the uneasy marriage between media outlets and political parties is primarily 
based on material interest and not on ideology. Thus, as the fortunes of political actors 
change so does their relationship to the media. 
 In fact, in some cases the consolidation of ownership in the hands of few powerful 
moguls has decreased the leverage that political parties have over the media. So, these 
media moguls and individual journalists sell coverage to politicians and businesses and 
the alliances they form with their clients are fleeting. The most glaring examples come 
from Romania and Bulgaria. Cristian Tudor Popescu and Ion Cristou, otherwise well-
regarded journalists in Romania, have supported sworn political enemies at different 
points in time, raising suspicion of opportunism (Coman, 2013:175). In Bulgaria, Irena 
Krasteva’s New Bulgarian Media Group, a dominant player in the media market, waged a 
viciously negative and, at times, very personal campaign against the leader of the largest 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  For example, in France Le Monde and Liberation have a left-center bias, while le Figaro and France-Soir 
have a right-center bias (Hallin & Mancini, 2004).	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opposition party Boyko Borisov during the 2009 parliamentary elections. Only a day 
after the elections, all the media owned by Krasteva started having a sycophantically 
positive coverage of Borisov and his government (Štětka, 2011). This unscrupulous 
journalistic culture is not confined to the two poorest members of the EU however. Based 
on recent documents leaked through WikiLeaks, the U.S. embassy in Lithuania had 
discussed the existence of detailed “price lists” for purchasing favorable coverage in the 
largest national newspapers (Örnebring, 2011b; Jegelevicius 2011). 
 Perhaps the most radical departure from Western practices occurs in the public 
broadcasting sector. In the West, this sector is either independent or control is diffuse and 
shared among different political parties in the parliament and civil society actors (Hallin 
& Mancini, 2004). In Eastern Europe, the situation is dramatically different. The 
governing parties tend to have a firm grip on state media and largely dictate the editorial 
content.2 As Table 2.1 shows, from the ten post-communist members of the EU, state 
intervention in media more generally is high in all but Slovenia and Estonia. However, 
when it comes to state-owned media, the government is quite active in Estonia too 
(Örnebring, 2011a) and certainly has influence over the managers of public media in 
Slovenia as evidenced by the frequent changes in the leadership of these media when 
power changes (Hrvatin, Kučić, & Petković, 2004). As Gross (2002: 58) has remarked, 
there “is the deep conviction that the media exist to serve the government or the state.” 
Such convictions are particularly true regarding state owned media. This is an enduring 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The state or the political majority in government can control public-broadcasting services in the West as 
well. The case of DeGaulle in the 1960s and his complete subordination of public broadcasting is a famous 
example from Western Europe.  DeGaulle accomplished this by controlling appointments to the formally 
independent office for regulating public broadcast. However, this kind of behavior is a rarity in the West 
nowadays (Hallin & Mancini, 2004).  
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legacy of communism because of the strong emphasis the communist parties put on 
media in their attempt to transform and control the societies in which they ruled.  
 The situation is much more dire in post-communist countries that are not part of 
the EU and which certainly have more corruption. In sum, the ruling parties control state 
broadcasting in Eastern Europe and, as I discuss in the next section, this has important 
implications for the content of such media and, consequently, for evaluations of the 
performance of the political system.  
 The last two dimensions for analyzing media systems are professionalization of 
journalism and state intervention in media. Since I already discussed the latter in the 
context of political parallelism, I now turn to journalistic professionalism. While it might 
seem easy to pin down in the first blush, there is no universally accepted set of high 
standards for professional journalistic and the norms that do develop are dependent on the 
national context (Hallin & Mancini, 2004). For example, historically speaking, American 
journalistic professionalism has been built around impartiality and “truthful” reporting of 
news. This ethos is nicely captured by a famous quote by Joseph & Stewart Alsop (1958: 
5), who said that “[h]is feet are much more important part of a reporter’s body than his 
head.” In other countries, the norm of impartial reporting is not emphasized as much. In 
general, journalistic professionalism is characterized by independence, distinct 
professional norms (e.g. obligation to protect confidential sources, separate advertising 
from editorial content, and standards of excellence), and public service orientation (i.e. 
the extent to which journalists feel that they serve the public) (Hallin & Mancini, 2004). 
 As Table 2.1 shows, journalistic professionalism is rather low in most of the CEE 
countries. Only Poland and Slovenia can boast to have somewhat more professional 
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journalistic culture, but no country can be said to have a high level professionalism in this 
industry. Admittedly, there is more variation in professionalism and media quality among 
the countries of Table 2.1, which is not captured by Hallin & Mancini’s (2004) four 
dimensions. But, as Gross (2002: 108) has aptly put it,  “Eastern European journalists 
have not developed a professional culture strong enough to counterbalance the political 
forces that dominate their societies.” 
 Some scholars portray an even grimmer picture of the situation.  Mungiu-Pippidi 
(2013) has argued that there is a lack of ethical norms that guide journalism in Eastern 
Europe and that everything is up for sale to the highest bidder. Similarly, Coman 
(2013:178), referring to corrupt media moguls in Romania, says that, “[a]ll these 
journalists, rich, famous and corrupt, flawlessly exploit doublespeak; they publicly 
exaggerate their roles as defenders of freedom of expression and cynically promote their 
personal interests behind this façade.” Others are less damning and have suggested that in 
other East European countries (e.g. Czech Republic), media seems to be much more 
independent and professional, and deeply influenced by Western ideas of “professional 
journalism” (Jirák & Köpplová, 2013: 186) 
 What determines whether Eastern European journalists become independent and 
adopt a “Western” style of journalism? Here Siebert, Peterson & Schramm’s (1956) 
incisive claim that media simply reflect the deeper societal and political structures is 
crucial (see also Mungiu-Pippidi, 2013). In other words, countries with endemic 
corruption in all nooks of society have little in the form of either formal or informal 
journalistic ethics.  As already discussed, media in such countries are either dominated by 
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local moguls or directly controlled by political and business interests. In other countries, 
where corruption levels are lower, there is a higher degree of professionalism. 
 A largely unexplored question is whether foreign ownership of media tends to 
influence the journalistic culture of the host country. There is a very strong foreign 
presence in the ownership of major media outlets throughout Eastern Europe. However, 
there is little research systematically investigating the relationship between foreign 
ownership and media development in this region (e.g. Waschkova Cisarova, 2008).  
 As the rest of this paper will argue, foreign media have a fundamentally different 
approach to the media market. Given that they usually are part of larger multinational 
media conglomerate coming from Western Europe (e.g. WAZ), they are more 
professional, less economically vulnerable and, thus, less likely to be “captured’ by local 
business and political interests. Foreign owned media are primarily driven by the logic of 
market competition and they depend on advertising revenues. When times get really 
tough, as they have during the recent great recession in Europe, they simply pack up and 
leave as witnessed by the exodus of foreign owned media from Bulgaria (Štětka, 2011).  
 When foreign and local media compete for audience and advertising market share, 
there tends to be tension depending on how closely the local media are backed by shadow 
economic actors. For example, the WAZ Group filed a lawsuit against the locally owned 
New Bulgarian Media (NBM) because of its unfair advantage in the market due to 
subsidies from actors with political links. The NBM, as the Bulgarian regulatory 
authorities independently confirmed in 2010, was engaged in price dumping to drive out 
competition (Štětka, 2011).  
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 The presence of foreign media in a given country has implications beyond the 
media market. The next section offers a theory of how exposure to different types of 
media affects trust in and satisfaction with democracy.  	   	  
Theory 
	  
 At the heart of the theoretical framework presented here is the ownership structure 
of media. The goal is to present a coherent account of the effect of media on satisfaction 
with the political system conditional on ownership.  
 I make three main arguments. First, I argue that while reading newspapers is in 
fact related to higher political trust and satisfaction with democracy, higher exposure to 
television broadcast does not have the same straightforward effect. Second, I argue that, 
due to economic pressures, foreign owned media employ more negative coverage and use 
negative frames more frequently in their newscasts. In contrast, state owned media report 
on more positive things and the frames are less negative. Third, and directly derived from 
the second argument, I argue that exposure to state owned media is related to higher 
levels of satisfaction with the political system while more exposure to foreign owned 
media has the opposite effect. 
The virtuous circle  
 
I agree with Norris (2000; 2011), who suggests that people who show greater interest in 
politics and have higher levels of sophistication tend to seek out political news coverage. 
Thus, in line with the virtuous circle theory, I argue that the habitual reading of 
newspapers reinforces practical knowledge, political trust, and satisfaction with 
democracy. 
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 However, newspapers are not a major source of news for many Eastern 
Europeans. The first column of Table 2.2 presents the weighted percentage of survey 
respondents who indicated that they spend at least 30 minutes a day reading news in 
newspapers. Only in Estonia and Bulgaria do people read as much as they do in Western 
Europe. On average, only about 17 percent of Eastern Europeans regularly read news in 
newspapers, while 26 percent do so in the West (see also bottom of Table 2.2).  In 
contrast, more than half of the respondents from Eastern Europe claim to spend at least 
half an hour watching news on TV every day. So, television is a far more important 
source of news for people in this region. It should be noted that Western Europeans spend 
more time watching news on TV than do people from the Mediterranean, who are more 
similar to Eastern Europeans in this regard. 
 But, what is the effect of news consumption from TV? I argue that exposure to 
such media does not have the same straightforward effect on political attitudes as 
exposure to print media does. I elaborate on this more below. 
 
Different owners different coverage 
 
 The key theoretical contribution of this article is to specify a more nuanced causal 
mechanism in which the ownership of media matters for both the content and tone of 
coverage and, consequently, for political attitudes. As discussed earlier, state-owned 
media, which still continue to be dominant players in the television broadcast market in 
Eastern Europe, are by and large firmly under the control of the ruling parties, and thus 
are biased in favor of such parties. The control comes from three sources. First, the 
government, or the parliament that they control, sets the subscription fees and thus 
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controls one of the main sources of revenues for public broadcasting. Second, in many 
countries the law limits the percentage of total revenues that can come from advertising. 
For example, the Bulgarian public service TV is limited to only fifteen minutes a day of 
advertising, and only four minutes of advertising can be shown during prime time 
(Štětka, 2011). Similarly, in 2011 the parliament in Czech removed advertising from 
public news channels altogether (Štětka, 2012a). By severely restricting this stream of 
revenues to public broadcasting, successive governments are able to curtail the 
independence of such media. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, ruling parties get to 
appoint the boards of the state media (Dobek-Ostrowska, 2011; Štětka, 2011). This 
phenomenon is widespread and not only restricted to countries with high corruption. 
 If this is the case, and the government of the day has tremendous influence over 
public broadcasting, what do the governments do with their power? I argue that news 
coverage and the tone in such media tends to be generally more positive. They focus less 
on social ailments, for which the government could be legitimately blamed, and spend 
more time emphasizing the achievements of the government. Depending on how blatant 
the control is, the public service TV can become a PR platform for the rulers and a 
mouthpiece of the government. The Moldovan case is a good example of such practices. 
A 2007 study with content analysis of in news public service TV, Moldova 1, revealed 
that this outlet spends an inordinate amount of time showing the Moldovan President 
Voronin opening tractor stations, visiting farms, and presenting positive economic news, 
never mind the fact that Moldova is one of the poorest countries in Europe (Udovičić, 
2007). While of course not all public TV stations are as “captured” as Moldova 1, as I 
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will show later, such media tend to have more positive coverage and tone, with important 
implications for political attitudes.  
 However, the situation is rather different when the owners of media are 
foreigners. I argue that the news coverage in foreign owned media is more sensational, 
scandal-driven, and overall more negative. But, why should foreign media rely on 
sensationalization and negative framing in news reporting? There are two interrelated 
reasons for this. First, news reporting on scandals, crime, corruption, social ailments and 
incompetence draws more audience than less dramatic coverage. In other words, 
quotidian news reporting about the dull business of politics does not sell as well as 
reporting on juicy sexual trespassing of politicians, gruesome murders, or financial 
malfeasance. As Helena Luczywo, an editor at Gazeta Wyborcza in Warsaw, once 
remarked about foreign-owned media, "When the consumer is king, there is a tendency to 
cater to the lowest tastes (Dempsey, 2004).” Since foreign media rely on advertising and 
not on support from political actors as their main source of revenues, such media outlets 
tend to report in a fashion that attracts audience, hence the tabloidization. Research from 
Western Europe has shown that market competition has in fact increased ‘tabloidization’ 
and ‘infotainment’ (Schulz, 1997, 1998).  
 The second reason as to why foreign media in Eastern Europe would resort to 
sensationalization is their internal structure and business philosophy. The Western media 
conglomerates that are responsible for the rise in negative coverage in West are the same 
ones that come to the East. When they come to the new media landscape, they bring their 
time-tested corporate practices with them as well.  
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 To sum up, foreign media, unlike domestic ones, are less likely to rely on local 
clientelisitc networks for revenues. They rely on ads and paid programming instead. 
Therefore, commercialization of media leads to competition for audiences and thus an 
increased reliance on lurid language, vivid imagery, and exaggerated scandals.  
 One might wonder about the content and the tone of news coverage in media that 
are neither state owned nor foreign dominated (i.e. privately owned domestic media). For 
such media, it is difficult to say a priori what the coverage will look like. It will greatly 
depend on who controls them and what the individual agendas of the owners are. For 
example, until it closed down in 2011, A1 TV in Macedonia was the most watched 
channel in the country and its owner was clearly siding with the opposition. Therefore the 
coverage was overly negative, especially against the government. In contrast, in 
Montenegro, the largest privately owned TV station, TV IN, has been close to the 
government led by Prime Minister Milo Đukanović and TV IN’s coverage has been 
largely uncritical of the government. More generally speaking, the more independent a 
media outlet is and the more it relies on market mechanisms for its revenues, the more it 
will approximate the foreign-owned media in their negative reporting and focus on 
sensational news. Such reporting is primarily due to the audience’s insatiable appetite for 
such coverage, and the consequent rating boost and advertising that come with it.  
 
Different coverage different effects on political attitudes 
 
 Do differences in the content and tone of coverage matter for political attitudes? I 
argue that they do. Specifically, given its more positive coverage and tone, exposure to 
state-owned media is related to higher evaluations of the political system. This does not 
imply that the state of democracy is better in a given country if more people tune in to 
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public broadcasting. It only means that the framing of the news will be more positive, 
thus fewer opportunities for video-malaise to manifest itself. By the same logic, higher 
exposure to sensationalist foreign media should lead to more politically cynical and 
disenchanted consumers.  
 But, why do coverage and tone matter for political attitudes? Media content and 
framing are crucial to understanding the effects that exposure to media has on political 
trust and satisfaction with the performance of the political system. As Watzlawick, 
Beavin & Jackson (1967) pointed out in their seminal work, there is an important 
conceptual distinction between ‘command’ and ‘report’ in communication. The first deals 
with what is said or the content of communication whereas the latter refers to how things 
are said or communicated. This distinction highlights the importance of language and 
presentation style for the communicating act and emphasizes the independent effect of 
the frame, which serves to augment what is said.  
 In the context of political opinion formation, research has shown that the framing 
of politics as dominated by “races,” where self-interested politicians compete with one 
another, can greatly increase the cynicism that citizens have towards the political. Just as 
importantly, when a frame is used, as Cappella & Jamieson (1997:42) have suggested, 
“[a] preexisting set of knowledge, including concepts, procedures, and, most important, 
their interconnection, has been cued and brought into conscious awareness.”  
 It is important to note that while in the U.S. the strategic frame predominates 
news coverage on politics, in Eastern Europe things are much more dire. In many cases, 
the direct frame is corruption or strong insinuations of self-interested behavior on the part 
of the political elite. In this context, the framing used in scandalizing news brings forth 
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deeply embedded notions about the corrupt nature of politicians and their self-interested 
endeavors. These cues are readily available because of the widespread cynicism that 
already exists about the motivations of politicians and the parties they run—this a deep 
legacy of authoritarian rule during communism. 
 However, not all sensationalist coverage is about corruption. Rarely do media 
outlets go in all-out war with political elites and expose corruption. A great deal of the 
sensational reporting focuses on social ills such as crime, disasters, poverty and other 
misfortunes. Yet, if the content and framing is negative, a similar set of interconnected 
knowledge and biases are made salient because of preexisting beliefs about 
incompetence, lack of concern for the public and self-interestedness of politicians. In 
other words, more negative reporting on crime and the breakdown of the social fabric 
(e.g. poverty) will have the effect of reducing public confidence in the willingness and 
ability of democratically elected representatives to solve these problems. Eastern 
Europeans are particularly susceptible to being affected by such coverage because crime 
was kept under check during communism and social ailments were mitigated by the state 
safety net.  It is not surprising that, in conversations with people who remember living 
under communism, nostalgia for former system is oftentimes manifested in the need for 
order and strong leadership that would keep problems like crime and poverty under 
control. I now turn to the research design and discuss the empirical strategy employed to 
test the arguments put forth in this section.  
  
Data, operationalization, and research design 
 
 The data come from three main sources. First, I test the more fine-grained 
hypotheses about the effect of media ownership on political attitudes by relying on a 
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special Eurobarometer survey (68.1) that was conducted between September and 
November of 2007. This survey has detailed survey items on media use by outlet for the 
following Eastern European countries:  Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. This 
survey is unique in its coverage of media use patterns in Europe and includes two 
Balkans countries besides the ten post-communist members of the EU, thus, making it an 
excellent one for the purposes of this paper. Its main limitation is that it does not offer 
detailed information about the frequency with which people consume media. For that 
reason, I also rely on the most recent wave (5th) of European Social Surveys (ESS) that 
was conducted in 2010 and that has a number survey items regarding the frequency of 
media use for a variety of media, but not for specific media outlets. The ESS includes all 
the ten post-communist members of the EU except Latvia plus Ukraine and Russia. 
 The second source of data I use is summaries of content analysis of TV prime 
time domestic news in ten South East European countries. The project was conducted in 
2007 by the Media Plan Institute - Sarajevo with partner organizations in Albania, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, 
Romania, and Serbia.3 The findings and the country reports were published in an edited 
book by Radenko Udovičić (2007). The researchers identified two media outlets for each 
country—the primetime news programs of the public broadcaster and the strongest 
commercial channel. They followed these media for one month between April 1 and 
April 30, and, among other things, coded the content as well as orientation or attitude to 
the subjects covered (i.e. framing). Specifically, both content and framing were coded 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Accessed from http://www.mediaplan.ba/docs/Prezentacija/intro.htm, on February 5, 2013. 
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using three categories, negative, neutral, and positive yielding, “for example, negative 
content with neutral journalist's attitude (e.g. speaking about increasing crime in 
Sarajevo, but presented objectively and impartially by the journalist). Or, positive content 
and negative attitude (e.g. reporting on rising living standard in Serbia, but the journalists 
comments that the country does not deserve this because of involvement in the war in 
BiH).4” 
 The main drawback of this data is that it does not include all the countries 
analyzed in the regression analyses. That said, there is no reason to suppose that the 
proposed causal mechanisms about the effect of ownership on news content and tone do 
not apply to the entire post-communist world. Thus, this data is invaluable because it 
comparatively investigates the content as well as the frame of news coverage across 10 
countries from different parts of post-communist Europe. Furthermore, it does so for TV 
media, which, as already discussed, are by far the most important source of news for 
people in this region. The data for the economic country-level variables come from 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators. I use indicators for GDP growth (annual 
%), unemployment, and GNI per capita. I also use the Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI).  
 Finally, I rely on qualitative country reports from the Media and Democracy in 
Central and Eastern Europe (MDCEE) project based of Oxford University5. The country 
reports are extensive and categorize the different media systems based on Hallin & 
Mancini’s (2004) three media systems dimensions and typology, which I use in this 
paper.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Ibid. 
 
5 Accessed from http://mde.politics.ox.ac.uk/index.php/country-reports, on February 5, 2013. 
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 As for the dependent variables, (1) I have constructed latent variables using scores 
from factor analysis and (2) I rely on individual indicators of satisfaction with 
democracy. Specifically, I have constructed a latent variable tapping into political trust6 
using survey items about trust in the national parliament, trust in the legal system, and 
trust in the police. For the Eurobarometer survey, I rely on an item that asks respondents 
the following question:  On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very 
satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in (OUR COUNTRY)? I 
have dichotomized this variable to take a value of 1 if respondents answer very satisfied 
or fairly satisfied and 0 otherwise.7  
 For the analysis using data from the ESS survey, in addition to the political trust 
factor, which constructed using the same three variables of political trust as in the 
Eurobarometer survey, I construct another latent variable that uses information from 
these three questions: On the whole how satisfied are you with the present state of the 
economy in [country]? Now thinking about the [country] government, how satisfied are 
you with the way it is doing its job? And on the whole, how satisfied are you with the 
way democracy works in [country]? Only one factor with an eigenvalue higher than 1 
emerged out of this factor analysis, indicating that the score measures one dimension of 
macro government satisfaction.  The goal of using the second set of variables about 
satisfaction with how democracy works is to test whether the results about the effect of 
media on attitudes are robust when broader macro indicators of performance are used.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Both the Eurobarometer and the ESS5 survey ask respondents to indicate their political trust, but the 
former relies on dummy variables taking a value of 1 if a person trusts a particular institutions, while the 
latter presents a more fine-grained scale from 1-10 (extremely dissatisfied-extremely satisfied). The factor 
analysis reveals that in both cases we are tapping into political trust because only one factor has an 
eigenvalue greater than 1.  
 
7 I could not do the same dichotomization for the ESS survey data because the scale for the satisfaction 
with democracy variable runs from 1-10.  
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 Regarding the key independent variables of interest, I have constructed a number 
of variables measuring exposure to different types of media. First, since I am interested in 
the effects of ownership on political attitudes, I have created a dataset with information 
about the most watched TV stations and their owbership structure for all the ten post-
communist members of the EU plus Croatia and Macedonia. In this dataset, each public 
broadcaster has been coded as state owned and each TV channel with more than 50% 
stake by a foreign person or company has been coded as foreign owned. Most of the data 
for the coding came from the country reports published by the Media and Democracy in 
Central and Eastern Europe (MDCEE) project. Since MDCEE did not have reports for 
Croatia and Macedonia, I relied on country reports from the Media Ownership and Its 
Impact on Media Independence and Pluralism8 project as starting points (Petković, 
2004). I then crosschecked with other sources to make sure that media ownership coding 
was correct. All the coding refers to the ownership structure in 2007, because that is the 
year when the Eurobarometer survey (68.1) was conducted. 
 The next step was to match the ownership data for TV stations with individual 
level exposure to such media. Namely, the Eurobarometer survey asks respondents the 
following question: Can you tell me the TV channels, if any, that you regularly watch, 
meaning at least five times a week? They list a large number of TV outlets, and I created 
dummy variables that take values of 1 every time a respondent indicated that they 
watched any state owned media (State TV) and any foreign owned media (Foreign TV).9 I 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Accessed from http://www2.mirovni-institut.si/media_ownership/index.htm, on February 2, 2013. 
 
9 The Eurobarometer survey has questions about a number of foreign outlets, such as the CNN, HBO and 
other, which are foreign but that do not operate within the country as local outlets. Such media were not 
counted as foreign owned for the purposes of this paper.  
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also created dummy variables for those that watched state TV only (State TV only) and 
foreign TV only (Foreign TV only).  
 Second, I use items from the ESS survey about the frequency with which people 
read newspapers and watch television. The questions asked the following: How much of 
your time watching television is spent watching news or programmes about politics and 
current affairs? And how much of this [newspaper reading] time is spent reading about 
politics and current affairs?10 These two items are measured on a scale from 1-7, going 
from no time at all (1) to more than 3 hours (7).  
 Regarding the controls in the multivariate analysis, I have included a set of 
standard demographic variables including sex, age, size of the community, and income, 
which other studies have found to be related with political trust and satisfaction with 
democracy. As for the country-level controls, I have included controls for 
macroeconomic performance such as GDP growth, unemployment, and GNI per capita 
(Anderson & Tverdova, 2003). I have also included CPI as a measure of corruption. 
Finally, since previous research (Ceka, 2013) has shown that political competition 
matters for political trust, I include a measure for the effective number of parties from the 
most recent parliamentary elections (ENP) (Gallagher, 2012).  
 For the empirical analysis, I use multi-level models with individuals (1 level) and 
countries (2 level) in a multivariate framework to test for a number of hypotheses about 
the impact of media on attitudes.11 This method is appropriate because it accounts for the 
fact that individuals are clustered within countries. All the results presented from the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 These two items had seven categories going from no time at all (1) to more than 3 hours (7).  
 
11 The individual levels are fixed, whereas the country-level effects are random. See Gelman & Hill (2007). 
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multi-level models are obtained by using maximum-likelihood estimation. I now turn to 
the discussion of the empirical results. 
 
Results 
 
 I present the results of the different analyses in several steps. I begin by 
examining the overall effect of exposure to news in print and television. Table 2.3 shows 
the regression results with the factor scores for political trust and macro economic 
satisfaction as the dependent variables. Two results stand out. First, regardless of the 
model specification, more time spent reading news in print newspapers is positively and 
significantly related to both political trust and satisfaction with macro government 
performance (models 3-6). This effect is very robust and it does not change when 
exposure to television is controlled for (model 5 and 6). The same cannot be said about 
exposure to news in television broadcasting, and this is the second main result. The effect 
for this variable is either statistically insignificant (model 2 and 5) or inconsistent with 
changing signs (model 1 and 6).  
 In sum, the results support the hypothesis that only exposure to print media is 
related to higher political trust and satisfaction with how the government and democracy 
work. This result is in line with the literature that finds a positive link between exposure 
to newspapers and increased confidence in the political system (Robinson, 1974; Moy & 
Pfau, 2000). However, the overall effect of higher TV news consumption on political 
trust and satisfaction with the political system is not significant. As we will see shortly, 
the effect of exposure to TV is dependent on media ownership.  
 From the rest of the individual-level variables, only higher income is consistently 
and positively related to both trust in and satisfaction with the political system. Males are 
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less likely to put trust in political institutions than females, as shown by the negative sign 
on the Male variable, but sex does not matter for satisfaction with the macro government 
performance. The opposite seems to be the case for the age variable. More specifically, 
older people are less likely to be satisfied with the performance of the system than 
younger people, but age does not matter for political trust. Higher levels of education are 
associated with more trust and satisfaction, but this effect is not always significant.  
 All the coefficients for the country-level variables have the expected signs, but 
they do not consistently cross conventional thresholds of statistical significance. Citizens 
from richer countries, as measured by the effect of the logged GNI per capita variable, 
tend to put more trust in their political institutions and express more satisfaction with the 
democratic system. The effect of this variable is the most consistent one. Cleaner 
government with less corruption (higher scores on the Corruption variable) is positively 
related to higher political trust, but this effect is statistically significant only in model 1. 
Quite interestingly, GDP growth is positively associated with the latent variable 
measuring macro government satisfaction but not with the one measuring political trust. 
Finally, as expected, more political competition (Competition) is negatively associated 
with trust and satisfaction, but this effect is statistically significant at the 0.05 level only 
in model 1.  
The main argument of this paper is that ownership of media determines the 
content and framing used in news reporting and that this has important implications for 
political attitudes. I now show evidence to support this argument. Figure 2.1 presents data 
from content analysis of the two most watched TV outlets in ten Eastern European 
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countries. The data is broken down by content, frame and ownership structure. Table 2.4 
lists all the countries and channels used in this analysis.  
 
 While the content analysis reveals that the majority of the news reporting has 
neutral content and a neutral frame, a large proportion of the reports are negative and 
foreign owned media report far more news with negative content and negative frame. 
First, Figure 2.1 shows that on average 20% of all news reports in state owned media 
have a positive frame. This proportion is far lower for foreign owned media.  The average 
number of positively framed reports for the four foreign owned media analyzed in this 
study is just over 6%. Domestic owned media fall somewhere in between with 13.5%. 
Moving to the right in Figure 2.1, we see that both foreign and domestic owned private 
media tend to employ a more negative frame in their news reports than state media do. 
But, most strikingly, the news reports with negative content and negative framing are far 
more likely to be transmitted in foreign owned TV channels. While news with negative 
content and frame make up only about 5% of the total reporting for state media, foreign 
owned ones report more than three times as many negative news with a negative frame 
(16.5%). Again, domestic owned private media fall in between. 
 The results presented in Udovičić (2007) do not consistently break down the 
reporting based on issues. But, the country report for Hungary offers more detailed data 
on coverage for a variety of issues including the Hungarian parliament, party politics, as 
well as crime, scandals, and disaster (Bajomi-Lázár & Monori, 2007). As Figure 2.2 
shows, the differences in reporting between the state owned MTV and the foreign owned 
RTL TV channel are quite fascinating. Over 60% of the RTL TV news articles were on 
crime, scandals, and disaster, two-thirds of which had negative content. Another 12% 
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were on the Hungarian parliament and party politics, more than half of which had 
negative content. In contrast, for the state-owned MTV only 37% of the news reports 
were on crime, scandals, and disasters, of which less than half had negative content. 
Furthermore, reporting on the Hungarian parliament and party politics comprised 22% of 
total reporting for this state channel, only a third of which were coded as having negative 
content. It is important to note that framing was also more negative for the foreign owned 
outlet across both categories of news (i.e. societal ills and politics). In a nutshell, the 
largest foreign TV in Hungary allocates an overwhelming section of its news programme 
to reports about crime, scandals and disaster. The content and framing of the reports are 
far more negative than that of the state TV. 
  The news reports analyzed above are on issues that are most likely to affect public 
attitudes towards the political system and its performance. I now present evidence from 
regression analysis showing that stark differences in content and tone of reporting as a 
result of ownership matter for public opinion. First, Table 2.5 presents the results from a 
multi-level logistic regression analysis with perceptions of crime as the dependent 
variable12. Exposure to state owned TV is associated with a lower probability of 
indicating that crime is an important issue while exposure to foreign owned TV is 
associated with an increased probability of seeing crime as an issue. Older people and, 
unsurprisingly, people living in larger cities tend to be more concerned about crime. 
Those who are more satisfied with the national economy are also more likely to be 
concerned with this issue. None of the country-level variables is statistically significant. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Specifically, the Eurobarometer survey asked the respondents: What do you think are the two most 
important issues facing (OUR COUNTRY) at the moment? A dichotomous variable was created taken a 
value of 1 for every respondent that listed crime as one of the two most important issues.  
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 These results suggest that exposure to foreign media, which tends to specialize in 
scandalization and negative coverage, does in fact prime people to view crime as an 
important societal ill. The opposite is the case for state owned media because the content 
and framing of news is far less negative than in foreign owned media.  
 The more important question is whether ownership of media matters for political 
trust and satisfaction with the democratic system. Table 2.6 presents regressions results, 
which strongly suggest that it does. As can be seen from model 1 and 2, regular exposure 
to state owned TV (State TV) is related to both more political trust and higher satisfaction 
with democracy. This effect is highly statistically significant. The effect of regularly 
watching foreign owned TV is statistically insignificant when we control for exposure to 
state TV. Exposure to foreign TV tends to depress political trust and satisfaction with 
democracy only in cases where foreign outlets are the main source of news as measured 
by the effect of the variable Foreign TV only in model 3 and 4. In other words, 
individuals that rely primarily on foreign owned media for news (i.e. watch them at	  least	  five	  times	  a	  week	  but	  do	  not	  spend	  as	  much	  time	  watching	  state	  TV)	  are	  less	  trustful	  of	  political	  institutions	  and	  express	  lower	  levels	  of	  satisfaction	  with	  the	  political	  system	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  	  	   The	  results	  suggest	  a	  complex	  reality	  of	  multiple	  sources	  of	  media	  influence	  the	  effects	  of	  which	  are	  difficult	  to	  isolate,	  which	  is	  not	  all	  that	  surprising.	  When	  individuals	  spend	  significant	  amounts	  of	  time	  watching	  state	  and	  foreign	  media,	  the	  more	  positive	  coverage	  and	  tone	  of	  the	  reporting	  in	  state	  TV	  seems	  to	  neutralize	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  negative	  reporting	  in	  foreign	  owned	  media.	  	  But,	  more	  interestingly,	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about	  a	  fifth	  of	  all	  respondents	  indicate	  that	  they	  watch	  foreign	  owned	  TV	  at	  least	  five	  times	  a	  week	  but	  that	  they	  do	  not	  spend	  as	  much	  time	  watching	  state	  TV.	  On	  average,	  and	  controlling	  for	  other	  variables,	  these	  people	  have	  lower	  political	  trust	  and	  are	  less	  satisfied	  with	  how	  democracy	  works.	  
 One could argue that, because of personal characteristics, people who watch 
foreign outlets are drawn to more sensational news and hold the political system in lower 
regard to begin with. It is quite likely that certain types of people are more likely to seek 
out television programs that confirm their beliefs and biases about crime, scandals, and 
political corruptions. This is fair criticism of findings about the effect of media on public 
opinion coming from survey designs more generally (Norris, 2000). Two things can be 
said in response to this criticism. First, I do not argue that people are tabula rasa with no 
preconceptions and beliefs. In fact, the theoretical framework explicitly enlists the 
complex set of knowledge and biases to explain how negative framing of news causes 
disaffection. Exposure to the different types of media makes certain issues salient while 
depressing others (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997:59).  
 Second, and more importantly, we already know from lab experiments that ceteris 
paribus exposure to material that suggests political corruption decreases political efficacy 
regardless of the preexisting beliefs (Robinson, 1976). The crucial step in my analysis has 
been to show that the content and tone of state owned media is far more positive than the 
content and tone of foreign owned media. The content analysis strongly supports this 
preposition. Thus, given the evidence from the content analysis and the fact that exposure 
to negative coverage and tone has been found to decrease political efficacy and trust in 
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experimental designs, the effects we observe for exposure to state and foreign media are 
to be expected.   
 To return to the regression results of table 2.6, more satisfaction with the national 
economy is related to high political trust and more satisfaction with democracy, and this 
effect is robust to different model specifications. The coefficients for the rest of the 
control variables are broadly consistent with those of table 2.3. From the country level 
variables, less corruption in a country is associated with more political trust (Corruption).  
Similarly, more political competition is associated with less political trust (model 1 and 
3), confirming findings from earlier work (Ceka, 2013). The effect of these two variables 
is not significant in the models with satisfaction with democracy as the dependent 
variable (model 2 and 4).  Finally, the macroeconomic variables do not have consistent 
effects, and unemployment and GNI per capita have the opposite signs of what we would 
expect.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 The conceptual framework through which media evolution in Eastern Europe has 
been analyzed derives from the Western-centric and normatively motivated 
understanding of media as guardians of free speech and defenders of the public interests 
vis-à-vis the state. By focusing on media as guarantors of personal freedoms, and clean 
government (i.e. watchdog media), analysts have failed to investigate a host of 
fascinating trends that do not fall neatly in this normative framework (Jirák & Köpplová, 
2013). For example, nominally free and independent media outlets might be little more 
than platforms for advancing the tight economic interests of the owners (i.e. moguls) 
through selling of coverage time to both political and business interests. Similarly, the 
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entrance of multinational media conglomerates in the local markets of Eastern Europe has 
been understudied because it has been seen as a sign of progress. In this sense, in an 
overly simplistic analysis most have assumed that increasingly free media would 
contribute to the consolidation of democracy.  
 This paper has painted a more nuanced picture about media more generally, and 
the exposure to foreign media more specifically. The analysis has shown that the content 
and framing of news differs markedly between state owned and foreign media. The more 
negative coverage and framing in foreign media have the effect of depressing political 
trust and satisfaction with the system. However, the results show that this is the case only 
if foreign media are the predominant source of news for people. In contrast, more 
exposure to state owned media decreases the likelihood of political distrust and negative 
evaluations of the political system. So, are we better off with only government controlled 
state-run TV, as was the case under communism?  No, of course not, but this article 
shows that the picture is more complicated and simply assuming that more media 
freedom leads to better democratic outcomes is not warranted. 
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Tables and figures 
	   Table	  2.1.	  THE	  MEDIA	  SYSTEMS	  OF	  CEE	  	  
 Development of the 
press Political Parallelism Professionalism State Intervention 
Bulgaria Low High Low High 
Estonia High Low Low Low 
Czech Rep. Low High Low High 
Hungary Low High Low High 
Latvia Low High Low High 
Lithuania Low Medium Low High 
Poland High High Medium High 
Romania Low High Low High 
Slovakia Low High Low High 
Slovenia Medium Medium Medium Medium 
Note: The table was constructed using information from country reports that were produced by 
researchers from the Media and Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe (MDCEE) project at 
Oxford University. The evaluations, which are based on extensive case studies and interview data, are 
presented in the appendixes of the country reports and are directly based off Hallin & Mancini’s 
(2004) four dimensions presented in this table.  
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Table 2.2. MEDIA CONSUMPTION IN EAST AND WEST 
 
 News in Newspapers News in TV 
 (% at least 0.5 hour) 
(% at least 0.5 
hour) 
Slovenia 11 48 
Poland 12 55 
Hungary 13 41 
Slovakia 16 62 
Great Britain 16 57 
Russia 17 53 
Czech 
Republic 17 52 
Lithuania 17 48 
Croatia 18 51 
Ukraine 18 50 
Portugal 21 67 
Spain 22 54 
France 22 67 
Germany 22 52 
Estonia 26 74 
Sweden 27 61 
Bulgaria 28 71 
Belgium 30 62 
Denmark 31 75 
Finland 31 65 
Netherlands 33 70 
Greece 34 54 
   
Mediterranean 26 58 
Western 
Europe 26 64 
Eastern 
Europe 17 55 
SOURCE: ESS Round 5 
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Table 2.3. MULTILEVEL MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES OF 
POLITICAL ATTITUDES 
 
 
   Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 
VARIABLES 
Political 
Trust 
Macro Gov. 
Satisfaction 
Political 
Trust 
Macro Gov. 
Satisfaction 
Political 
Trust 
Macro Gov. 
Satisfaction 
Newspapers   0.050*** 0.035** 0.056*** 0.049*** 
   (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Television 0.014* 0.000   -0.006 -0.017* 
 (0.006) (0.006)   (0.007) (0.007) 
Male -0.069*** -0.017 -0.068*** -0.006 -0.068*** -0.003 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Age 0.000 -0.001* -0.000 -0.002*** -0.000 -0.002** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Education 0.005* 0.005* 0.005 0.006* 0.005 0.007* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Income 0.020*** 0.033*** 0.023*** 0.030*** 0.023*** 0.029*** 
In
di
vid
ua
l L
ev
el 
V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Corruption (CPI) 0.125* 0.033 0.117 0.036 0.117 0.037 
 (0.058) (0.062) (0.061) (0.062) (0.061) (0.062) 
GDP Growth (%) 0.046 0.066* 0.042 0.069* 0.043 0.071* 
 (0.030) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
Log GNI/PC 0.406* 0.398 0.442* 0.428* 0.440* 0.417* 
 (0.197) (0.211) (0.208) (0.212) (0.208) (0.211) 
Competition -0.119* -0.098 -0.113 -0.092 -0.115 -0.093 
 (0.056) (0.060) (0.059) (0.060) (0.059) (0.060) 
Constant -4.328* -3.978* -4.650* -4.308* -4.619* -4.203* 
 (1.835) (1.973) (1.940) (1.976) (1.937) (1.970) 
C
ou
nt
ry
 L
ev
el 
V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
       
 simga_u 0.170*** 0.183*** 0.179*** 0.182*** 0.179*** 0.182*** 
 sigma_e 0.832*** 0.810*** 0.819*** 0.802*** 0.818*** 0.800*** 
 Observations 14,512 14,131 9,854 9,666 9,565 9,393 
 Countries 11 11 11 11 11 11 
Standard errors in parentheses   *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
SOURCE: ESS5 
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Table 2.4. THE TV CHANNELS INCLUDED IN THE CONTENT ANALYSIS BY 
COUNTRY AND OWNERSHIP 
 
Country Public service TV Private service TV 
 Channel Channel Ownership 
Albania  TVSH Top Channel Domestic 
Bosnia  BHT NTV Hayat Domestic 
Bulgaria  BNT bTV Foreign 
Croatia  HTV Nova TV Foreign 
Hungary  MTV RTL Klub Foreign 
Macedonia  MTV A1 Domestic 
Moldova  Moldova 1 TV7 Domestic 
Montenegro  TVCG TV IN Domestic 
Romania TVR1 Antena 1 Domestic 
Serbia  RTS B92 Foreign 
SOURCE: Udovičić (2007) 
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Table 2.5. MULTILEVEL MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES OF 
PERCEPTIONS OF CRIME 
 
 VARIABLES Crime  
  Coeff. SE 
State TV -0.113* (0.052) 
Foreign TV 0.201** (0.062) 
Econ. Situation 0.107*** (0.032) 
Education -0.008 (0.009) 
Male -0.002 (0.045) 
Age 0.065*** (0.015) 
Size of comm. 0.071* (0.028) 
In
di
vid
ua
l L
ev
el 
V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
   
Corruption (CPI) -0.054 (0.243) 
GDP Growth (%) 0.027 (0.050) 
Unemployment 0.004 (0.027) 
Log GNI/PC 0.779 (0.434) 
Competition 0.934 (0.885) 
Constant -11.894 (8.188) 
   
Observations 11,540  C
ou
nt
ry
 L
ev
el 
V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
Countries 12  
 *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
SOURCE: Eurobarometer 68.1 
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Table 2.6. MULTILEVEL MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES OF POLITICAL 
ATTITUDES 
  
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
VARIABLES 
Political 
Trust Dem. Sat. 
Political 
Trust Dem. Sat. 
Foreign TV -0.009 0.019   
 (0.019) (0.058)   
Foreign TV only   -0.038* -0.117* 
   (0.019) (0.058) 
State TV 0.056*** 0.163***   
 (0.017) (0.050)   
Econ. Situation 0.290*** 0.982*** 0.291*** 0.987*** 
 (0.010) (0.033) (0.010) (0.033) 
Education 0.004 0.025** 0.004 0.026** 
 (0.003) (0.009) (0.003) (0.009) 
Male -0.052*** 0.025 -0.053*** 0.021 
 (0.014) (0.042) (0.014) (0.042) 
Age -0.008 -0.080*** -0.006 -0.074*** 
 (0.005) (0.014) (0.005) (0.014) 
Size of comm. -0.006 0.067* -0.008 0.062* 
In
di
vid
ua
l L
ev
el 
V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
 (0.009) (0.027) (0.009) (0.027) 
      
Corruption (CPI) 0.292*** 0.097 0.289*** 0.081 
 (0.055) (0.212) (0.055) (0.206) 
GDP Growth (%) 0.028 -0.011 0.028 -0.014 
 (0.019) (0.073) (0.019) (0.071) 
Unemployment 0.003 0.043** 0.002 0.040* 
 (0.004) (0.016) (0.004) (0.016) 
Log GNI/PC -0.668*** 0.126 -0.654*** 0.186 
 (0.189) (0.733) (0.189) (0.713) 
Competition -0.156** -0.002 -0.158** -0.001 
C
ou
nt
ry
 L
ev
el 
V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
 (0.049) (0.189) (0.049) (0.184) 
 Constant 4.918** -4.729 4.835** -5.086 
  (1.701) (6.578) (1.694) (6.404) 
 sigma_u 0.084***  0.084***  
 sigma_e 0.698***  0.698***  
 Observations 9,863 11,188 9,863 11,188 
 Countries 12 12 12 12 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
SOURCE: Eurobarometer 68.1 
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Figure 2.1.  
 
 
Note: Figure 2.1 was constructed using information from country reports that were 
produced by Media Plan Institute - Sarajevo with partner organizations: Albanian Media 
Institute, Albania; Center for Independent Journalism, Hungary; Center for Independent 
Journalism, Romania, Independent Journalism Center, Moldova; International Center for 
Education of Journalists, Croatia; Macedonian Institute for Media, Macedonia; Media 
Development Center, Bulgaria; Montenegro Media Institute, Montenegro; Novi Sad School 
of Journalism, Serbia.  
SOURCE: Udovičić (2007) 
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Figure 2.2 
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Democratic Satisfaction and Support for non-mainstream Parties in Eastern Europe 
 
One of the most consistent findings from the literature on political attitudes in the post-
communist world is the high level of distrust of and dissatisfaction with the main 
institutions of democracy (Rose, 2009; Pop-Eleches & Tucker, 2011). Political parties 
have fared the worst: The overwhelming majority of East Europeans expresses little or no 
trust in parties, and considers their leaders to be self-serving. 
  This dissatisfaction with parties and their leaders has led to a general 
dissatisfaction with democracy, with troubling implications for political participation and 
electoral behavior. The existing literature has shown that dissatisfaction with democracy 
breads apathy, which leads to lower voter turnout. Dissatisfied voters are also less likely 
to spend time working for parties, further hampering the grassroots support for parties 
and undermining their legitimacy (Ceka, 2013).  
 Not all dissatisfied or disillusioned citizens, however, are hopelessly apathetic. 
Dissatisfaction can outrage voters and spur them to mobilize for opposition parties. The 
extent to which dissatisfied voters can be mobilized to vote instead of withdrawing 
completely from the political process is an empirical question that has received little 
attention in the context of Eastern Europe. Even more important and equally understudied 
is the electoral behavior of these citizens: What kinds of parties are able to tap into this 
reservoir of discontent? Are mainstream opposition parties able to mobilize these 
dissatisfied voters, or do they opt for non-mainstream parties instead? The existing 
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research has relied primarily on aggregate data from electoral results, and has assumed 
that the protest vote of the dissatisfied citizens is to be blamed for the lack of 
consolidation of party systems in Eastern Europe (e.g. Pop-Eleches, 2010). However, no 
study has systematically examined the electoral behavior of disillusioned voters in this 
region, despite their relative proportion and electoral potential.  
 This article seeks to illuminate the electoral behavior of Eastern Europe’s 
dissatisfied citizens.1 I am particularly interested in studying the effects that 
dissatisfaction with the way democracy is working has on support for non-mainstream 
parties.2 Through an analysis of 80 Eurobarometer surveys conducted between 1992 and 
2004 in 10 Eastern European Countries, and six surveys from the Comparative Study of 
Electoral Systems (CSES) conducted between 2005 and 2011, I show that initially the 
dissatisfied voters were more likely to support the largest mainstream opposition parties. 
This result is puzzling because research from Western Europe has consistently shown that 
dissatisfied voters support extreme parties and not mainstream ones. The early period of 
the transition from communism helps explain this unusual voting behavior. Once the first 
generation of elections were held, the dissatisfied voters had at least one mainstream 
opposition party that had not been in power for whom to vote. Regardless of whether they 
were reformed communist parties or newly created parties, voters flocked to these 
opposition parties hoping for better living standards and protection from the precarious 
transition. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1 I use the term dissatisfied citizens to mean citizens who say that they are not satisfied with the actual way 
democracy works in their country.  
 2 Different authors have used different names for such parties. Niche parties, anti-establishment parties, 
anti-mainstream parties and unorthodox parties have all been used before. I call them non-mainstream 
parties because, although they might not have much in common, they share one key characteristic—they 
are distinctly not mainstream parties. 
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 However, once mainstream parties of different stripes had been tried, dissatisfied 
voters lost faith in mainstream options and turned to non-mainstream parties. From these 
parties, extreme nationalist and radical left parties have been far more likely to benefit 
from the dissatisfied vote than more moderate non-mainstream ones. Furthermore, I 
demonstrate that this gain for the more extreme or radical parties was at the expense of 
moderate non-mainstream ones because they compete for the support of the same group 
of dissatisfied voters. Data from more recent elections suggests that the voting behavior 
of dissatisfied citizens in Eastern Europe has “normalized” in the sense that it now 
resembles the voting behavior of dissatisfied West Europeans, who tend to support more 
extreme parties. Finally, I show that dissatisfaction with democracy is still more likely to 
result in abstention from the electoral process than in a vote for any party. I should note 
that I am not arguing that voters in Eastern Europe are electing progressively more 
extreme parties.  The argument I am making is that dissatisfied voters are most likely not 
to vote—but if they do vote they favor more extreme non-mainstream parties. 
 This paper utilizes a large number of surveys from different sources to show the 
time-dependent voting dynamics in post-communist Europe. It makes an empirical 
contribution to the literature that examines the electoral consequences of political 
attitudes, and especially to the literature on satisfaction with democracy. The theoretical 
framework and the findings of this paper also speak to a growing literature that studies 
voting patterns in countries that are transitioning away from authoritarianism and 
addresses concerns about the potential rise of anti-system parties in the early rounds of 
elections. The findings here suggest that scholars and policy-makers should not worry too 
much about the unpredictability of the elections at the beginning of the transition because 
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voters did not seem to immediately turn to extreme parties. This insight might be 
particularly appropriate for the countries swept by the Arab Spring, where free and fair 
elections are taking place for the first time in decades. In fact, although factions related to 
the Muslim Brotherhood have won elections in Egypt and Tunisia, they are centrist and 
far more moderate than the Salafists and other radical groups that many feared might end 
up dominating these societies (The Economist, 2012, February 18).  
 The rest of this article is organized in four sections. First, I discuss the relevant 
literature in comparative politics that deals with satisfaction with and support for 
democracy and its institutions as well as with the emergence of non-mainstream parties in 
Eastern Europe. Second, I sketch the theoretical framework and highlight the main 
hypotheses to be tested. Third, I discuss the data sources and the measures that I use for 
the main variables of interest, and describe the methods used. Fourth I discuss the 
findings. The final section concludes with the implications of my findings.  
1. Dissatisfied citizens and non-mainstream parties 
1.1 Satisfaction with democracy 
 What is the link between satisfaction with how democracy works and voting 
behavior? Do attitudes about the performance of the democratic system matter for 
electoral outcomes? In this section I explore how evaluations of the performance of 
democracy affect voting behavior.  
 It has become a truism in our field that, for democracies to be stable, citizens need 
to support the regime and that satisfaction with how democracy works creates a reserve 
of goodwill among citizens that is central to a well-functioning polity (Almond & Verba, 
1963). Even more importantly, research suggests that dissatisfaction with democracy 
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undergirds much of the support for extreme right parties in Western Europe (Arzheimer, 
2009). How much support does democracy enjoy in Europe? Research from both Eastern 
and Western Europe strongly suggests that support for democracy is deeply established 
and that, even in the newer democracies of Eastern Europe, very few people support any 
other form of government (Klingemann, 1999; Fuchs, Guidorossi & Svensson, 1995). 
 However, as Robert Dahl (1998) reminds us, it is important to make a distinction 
between support for the ideal of democracy and evaluations of how it performs in any 
given context. Thus, while the overwhelming majority of Europeans support democracy 
as a system, a large number of them, especially in Eastern Europe, are dissatisfied with 
how it works in practice. To a great extent, this dissatisfaction stems from the unrealistic 
expectations that East Europeans had about their personal circumstances once 
communism collapsed. The economic policies adopted by successive governments after 
1989 caused much hardship and failed to live up to the expectation of the citizens. This 
widespread disappointment with the outcomes of the transition, especially in the early 
years, led to a prevalent dissatisfaction with the working of democracy.  
 The causes of satisfaction with democracy have been extensively studied (see 
Tóka 1995; Waldron-Moore, 1999; and Schäfer, 2012). In contrast, we know little about 
its consequences for voting behavior, especially in Eastern Europe. But why should we 
care about whether people are satisfied or not with the way democracy works? It is clear 
that the Europe of today is not a breeding ground for anti-democratic sentiment, and, with 
few exceptions, democracy has never been more consolidated in the countries of the EU. 
As it turns out, however, there are many good reasons to care about the causes and, 
perhaps more importantly, the consequences of satisfaction with democracy. For 
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example, dissatisfied citizens have consistently outnumbered satisfied citizens in Eastern 
Europe for much of the 1990s, so their electoral potential is enormous (See Figure 3.1). 
The dissatisfaction we see in Figure 3.1 could be due to poor economic conditions, a 
perceived lack of opportunities and high levels corruption, or some other grievance. 
Whatever the root cause, this paper shows that such dissatisfaction it is likely to result in 
either a withdrawal from the process or in a protest vote.  
 One of the very few strands of literature that has systematically dealt with 
satisfaction with democracy is the literature on the extreme right in Western Europe. For 
example, Arzheimer (2009) finds that dissatisfaction with democracy in 13 Western 
European states is significantly related to support for extreme right parties, with the 
substantive effect being very large. Other studies report similar findings as well (see e.g. 
Knigge, 1998).  
 It is thus surprising that no study has systematically considered the electoral 
behavior of dissatisfied East Europeans, despite the fact that the number of dissatisfied 
citizens is much higher in this region than in Western Europe (Schäfer, 2012). The main 
focus of this paper is on the non-mainstream parties because, for theoretical reasons, they 
are the most likely beneficiaries of higher levels of dissatisfaction with democracy. Do 
such parties manage to capitalize on this large pool of dissatisfied democrats in Eastern 
Europe and what is the ideological profile of these kinds of parties? 
1.2 Non-mainstream parties  
 In order to study the electoral behavior of dissatisfied citizens, we need to 
categorize non-mainstream parties. This exercise is particularly challenging in the 
electoral arena of Eastern Europe, where parties often change labels between elections, or 
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enter in pre-electoral coalitions. The electoral systems of Eastern Europe are 
characterized by a constant entry and exit of parties from electoral competition, which 
has hindered the development of stable party systems (e.g. Rose, 2009; Haughton 2003; 
Haughton & Rybář 2008). This volatility has resulted in serious discontinuity in the 
supply of parties.3 From the 155 parties that have contested elections in the region 
between 1990 and 2007, only 19 parties have competed in all the elections!  
 Fortunately, Pop-Eleches (2010) in his excellent study of support for non-
mainstream or, as he calls them, unorthodox parties in Eastern Europe has simplified this 
task by conceptualizing and classifying four different kinds of non-mainstream parties. 
Since I rely on his typology, I need to discuss the four types of non-mainstream, or, as he 
calls them, “unorthodox” parties (UOPs) and how they are coded in some detail.  
 In more general terms, Pop-Eleches defines UOPs based on what they are not—
mainstream parties. The yardstick he uses to determine whether a given party is 
mainstream or not is the ideological spectrum of Western European democracies. He 
argues that this is warranted because the Western model provided a reference point for 
the East European parties once communism fell, and because many parties from the East 
tried hard to fit themselves in the established party families of the West. The actual 
typology of parties relies on three dimensions: economic policy orientation (anticapitalist 
vs. procapitalist), reliance on ethnonationalist appeals (nonethnic appeals vs. extreme 
nationalism), and the relative prominence of individual leaders (ideology/platform driven 
vs. nonideological/personality driven).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  The Czech Republic has had low levels of volatility, and thus is an important exception (Deegan-Krause 
& Haughton, 2010).	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 So, based on where an individual party falls on these three dimensions, it is coded 
as (1) radical left, (2) extreme nationalist, (3) nationalist populist, and (4) new/ centrist 
populist. As for the ideological underpinnings of the four types of parties, the radical left 
is composed of mostly unreformed Communist parties such as Czech and Moravian 
Communist Party (KSCM) and the Romanian Socialist Labor Party (PSM), which run on 
anticapitalist sentiments and a return to the good days of communism. The extreme 
nationalist camp is composed of parties such as Bulgaria’s Ataka, Romania’s PRM, and 
the Hungarian Life and Justice Party (MIEP), which rely on virulent nationalism and, 
oftentimes, anti-Semitism. National populist parties share a penchant for using 
nationalism with the extreme nationalist parties—but rely less on virulent nationalism 
and tend to focus their agenda on specific groups such as farmers (e.g. Hungary’s 
Smallholders (FKGP)) or religious conservatives (e.g. Poland’s League of Polish 
Families (LPR)). Finally, new/centrist-populist parties are characterized by dominating 
leaders who, as Pop-Eleches (2010: 231) puts it, tend to circumvent ideology “by 
claiming to be nonideological antipolitical formations.” Such parties adopt moderate 
positions on key issues such as the European integration and capitalism. The most famous 
cases of such parties include the Bulgarian National Movement Simeon II (NDSV), the 
Lithuanian Liberal Union (LLS) of former Prime Minister Rolandas Paksas, and Robert 
Fico’s Direction-Social Democracy (SMER) in Slovakia. See Table 3.1 for an overview 
of all non-mainstream parties in the ten Eastern European countries included in the 
analysis. 
 What does the existing literature say about the determinants of support for non-
mainstream parties in Europe? There are two general observations that can be made about 
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this literature. First, most of the existing work examines support for extreme right parties 
in Western Europe. As Arzheimer (2009: 259) notes, “Research on the voters of the 
extreme right in Western Europe has become a minor industry.” Second, there is very 
little comparative work done on non-mainstream parties in Eastern Europe (Mudde, 
2007). Most of the existing studies focus on extreme right parties and, with the exception 
if important cases studies, little work has been done on the determinants of support for 
other non-mainstream parties.  
 First, let’s look at the debate about the role of contextual factors and individual 
voter motivations for the rise of extreme right parties in Western Europe. Kitschelt 
(1996), for example, argues that the success of such parties hinges upon the convergence 
of moderately left and right parties towards the position of the median voter. This, he 
argues, leaves a void in the ideological spectrum that extreme parties, especially extreme 
right ones, manage to fill. This line of reasoning falls under the “political opportunity 
structure” approach, and other studies employing it have emphasized the importance of 
institutional variables such as electoral rules (e.g. PR systems) and the disproportionality 
of electoral outcomes for the rise of extreme parties. Macroeconomic conditions have 
featured heavily in the research on support for the extreme right but also for non-
mainstream parties more generally (Pop-Eleches, 2010). Poor economic conditions, 
measured through higher unemployment, inflation, income inequality and lower growth, 
should be associated with higher support for non-mainstream parties. I therefore control 
for the effect of all these economic variables in the regression analyses.    
 Others have highlighted the importance of individual factors, including political 
trust (Eatwell, 2000) and anti-EU attitudes (Arzheimer, 2009) for the success of extreme 
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right parties. Although different studies focus on different enabling factors, as Arzheimer 
& Carter (2006: 422) have suggested, “the majority of studies agree that fixed or 
permanent institutional features combine with more short-term, volatile or conjectural 
factors to produce an overall particular opportunity structure”.  
 Research on the extreme right in Eastern Europe has suggested that anti-
establishment sentiments and the convergence of positions among mainstream parties are 
partly to blame for the successes of the extreme right. Bustikova (2009:236), for example, 
finds that corruption and lack of accountability coupled, “with the convergence of the 
major moderate parties on key issues, creates an environment conducive for the success 
of the extreme right.” The convergence of the mainstream parties was largely caused by 
the ‘vacuum effect’ of the EU accession project, where EU conditionality forced 
governing parties to adopt more liberal positions on a number of issues. Thus, in the post-
accession period, we see an emergence of parties advocating anti-liberal policies 
(O’Dwyer & Schwartz, 2009).  
 As for the micro-level determinants of support for extreme right parties, the 
literature has provided mixed results. On the one hand, scholars have found that lower-
income people, working class people and those who live in rural areas are more likely to 
support extreme right parties (Minkenberg, 2002). In short, it is the losers of the 
transition that tend to support such parties. On the other hand, support for some extreme 
right parties, or according to Pop-Eleches’s (2010) typology extreme nationalist parties, 
(e.g. Romani’s PRM and the Hungarian Life and Justice Party) comes from more affluent 
and younger voters (Karsai, 1999). Therefore, in the main analysis, I include 
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demographic controls for age, sex, education, and financial outlook or income bracket to 
identify the demographic profile of the different non-mainstream parties. 
 Studying the structural and individual factors that determine support for extreme 
right parties has been very fruitful and has produced a large body of work. This research 
is partly motivated by a normative consideration about the undesirability of the extreme 
right in Europe, which has been the hallmark of xenophobia and intolerance. However, 
this narrow focus has sidetracked scholars from investigating the factors that enable the 
emergence of non-mainstream parties more generally. Some of the most interesting 
examples of such parties entering the scene come from Eastern Europe. Bulgaria’s 
National Movement Simeon II (NDSV) and Slovakia’s SMER are non-mainstream 
parties, but neither of them is extreme right—they are both new centrist/populist parties. 
Thus, it is important to expand our analytical scope to include the relevant factors that 
produce a “political opportunity structure” for the emergence of any non-mainstream 
party.  
 As already discussed, Pop-Eleches (2010) has made a contribution to this 
literature by developing a novel typology of non-mainstream parties and providing an 
account for their success. He shows that non-mainstream parties have been in the rise in 
Eastern Europe in the third generation of postcommunist elections as disenchanted voters 
have run out of mainstream parties to vote for (Pop-Eleches, 2010). As he puts it, 
“Whereas in first- and second-generation elections the anti-incumbent bias of East 
European voters generally benefited mainstream opponents and thereby contributed to 
healthy power alternation, in third-generation elections (i.e., elections occurring after two 
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or more distinct political camps have governed in the postcommunist period) voter 
disaffection with incumbents starts to benefit unorthodox parties.” 
  Implicit in this argument is the idea that the protest vote drives these electoral 
trends in Eastern Europe. However, the author does not provide a direct test of whether it 
is the protest vote that is actually driving the electoral outcomes. This is simply assumed. 
The main analysis does not include individual variables that tap into the attitudes of 
protest voters.4  We would expect that some non-mainstream parties benefit electorally 
more than others from dissatisfaction with democracy, and they do so at the expense of 
other non-mainstream parties – and, indeed, my results clearly show that this is the case. 
  Another limitation of Pop-Eleches’s (2010) study is that it focuses on election 
outcomes, and does not examine support for non-mainstream parties between elections. 
Speaking about a similar limitation of studies on the extreme right in Western Europe, 
Arzheimer (2009:261) notes that, “while election results are decisive for the creation, 
composition, and survival of governments, the ongoing level of support for the ER can 
have a tremendous impact on proposed and actually implemented policy via the strategic 
calculations of the established parties, even if the ER is not (yet) represented in 
parliament.” For that reason, it is important to move beyond the electoral results and 
examine the more sustained support for non-mainstream parties between elections as 
well.  
 Finally, aggregate level analysis of electoral support cannot account for the 
psychological processes that underlie different types of electoral behavior, because such 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  To be fair, the author conducts some preliminary analysis of survey data that suggest that voters without 
party ID, voters who do not believe that it matters who is in power, and those who are not satisfied with 
how democracy works (i.e. attitudes of likely protest voters) were more likely to vote for non-mainstream 
parties in third generation than in second generation elections. But, the author does not provide a detailed 
analysis of the types of non-mainstream parties that benefited from dissatisfied voters.  
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processes are observed at the individual level. Most of the studies employing aggregate 
level analysis have to assume the presence of such processes without being able to 
explicitly test them. The multilevel modeling approach that I adopt in this paper has the 
advantage of allowing us to jointly model the individual level sociodemographic and 
attitudinal effects and the country level or contextual effects.  
 Having discussed the main concepts of interest (i.e. satisfaction with the working 
of democracy and non-mainstream parties), I now lay out the theoretical framework used 
in this paper.   
2. Theoretical framework 
 My theoretical framework draws on the existing literature and provides a more 
complete account of the behavior of the dissatisfied democrats. The focus is on this 
group, because for most of the 1990s, it comprised the majority of the survey 
respondents. The main question I ask is the following one: what kinds of parties do the 
dissatisfied democrats in Eastern Europe support? Furthermore, is it the case that such 
voters simply withdraw from the political system or are some parties able to mobilize 
them? I make three main arguments. First, I argue that the extreme nationalist and radical 
left parties are far more likely to benefit from the dissatisfied group than the other two 
types of non-mainstream parties. In line with Pop-Eleches’s (2010) findings, this effect is 
only observed in the period roughly corresponding to the third-generation elections. 
Second, I argue that the gain for the more extreme or radical parties was done at the 
expense of moderate non-mainstream parties (i.e. national populist and new/centrist 
populist parties) because they compete for the support of the same group of dissatisfied 
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voters. Third, I argue that dissatisfaction with democracy is most likely to result in 
abstention from the electoral process.   
 Let’s begin by considering three possible types of electoral behavior. First, 
dissatisfied democrats might abstain from voting. If they are unhappy with economic 
outcomes or are convinced that the existing parties are self-serving and corrupt, they 
might simply stay home on Election Day or otherwise refuse to participate in the electoral 
process5. Research has shown that the losers of the reforms in Eastern Europe, whor are 
likely to be dissatisfied with democracy, have tended to abstain from voting (Greskovits, 
2007). I expect dissatisfaction with how democracy is working to be most strongly 
associated with this type of behavior. Second, dissatisfied democrats might dislike the 
ruling elites and the parties they run, but they might still support them. This could be, for 
example, due to deeply embedded clientelisitc networks linking ruling parties and their 
clients. For obvious reasons, this type of behavior is unlikely to emerge because the more 
dissatisfied one is with the ruling elites the more likely she is to either abstain or vote for 
political alternatives.  
 Third, dissatisfied voters who decide to participate in the process will tend to 
support opposition parties. Regardless of the source of dissatisfaction, opposition parties 
are likely to capitalize on the discontent of the electorate and convince at least some of 
them to vote. That said, it is not immediately clear which opposition parties stand to 
benefit from this situation. Are mainstream opposition parties likely to tap into the 
dissatisfaction or is it the case that non-mainstream parties, which run on anti-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5 For example, more determined voters might show up on Election Day and destroy the ballot. 
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establishment and extreme positions, are better positioned to benefit from such 
dissatisfaction?  
 The extant literature provides some guidelines about what electoral behavior we 
should expect and under what circumstances. Here I build on Pop-Eleches’s (2010) 
insight that the mainstream opposition parties were the most likely beneficiaries of the 
initial protest vote in Eastern Europe. In other words, in the second-generation elections, 
which followed the first free and democratic elections after the fall of communism in the 
early 1990s, mainstream opposition parties received the vote of the dissatisfied citizens. 
Again, this puzzling voting behavior can be explained by the fact that in every country 
studied here there was a mainstream opposition party or camp that could legitimately 
claim to be anti-establishment because it had no previous stints in government. Such 
claims seem to have worked because the anti-incumbency bias benefited mainstream 
opposition parties and not extreme ones. But, what parties, if any, did dissatisfied citizens 
support after the second generation-elections were completed and the mainstream 
alternatives had been tried? It is important to answer this question because the share of 
the dissatisfied democrats continued to comprise the majority of the survey respondents 
throughout the 2000s.  
 The main argument I make about the third-generation elections is that some but 
not all types of non-mainstream parties were able to tap into the discontent of the 
dissatisfied citizens. To be more precise, I argue that parties with more extreme or radical 
positions (i.e. radical left and extreme nationalist parties) were more successful in 
garnering the support dissatisfied citizens for at least two related reasons.  For one thing, 
the new/centrist and the national populist parties tend to be more moderate than the 
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radical left and extreme nationalist parties, and thus less likely to galvanize the anger or 
outrage of the dissatisfied democrats. Second, as the directional theory of voting 
suggests, voters prefer candidates or parties that are decisively ‘on their side’ of the 
ideological spectrum to parties that are more centrist (Rabinowitz & Macdonald, 1989).  
In the context of Eastern Europe, dissatisfied democrats who are prone to nationalistic 
appeals will prefer extreme nationalist parties to the more moderate national populist 
parties that also rely on nationalism.  
 Furthermore, extreme parties managed to gain support at the expense of other, 
moderate non-mainstream parties. The logic is the following: non-mainstream parties 
compete for the support of dissatisfied citizens. Such citizens are rightly seen by all 
stripes of non-mainstream parties as being up for grabs, because they tend to have weak 
party identification and because their dissatisfaction and anger is politically exploitable. 
However, this competition for the dissatisfied voter is a zero-sum game, with gains in 
support for one or more non-mainstream party translating in loss in support for other such 
parties. Vachudova’s (2008) finding that after EU accession, a gain for some non-
mainstream parties in Eastern Europe (e.g. nationalist parties) has been followed by a loss 
in electoral support for other non-mainstream parties (e.g. new/centrist parties) further 
supports this notion.  
 Therefore, if I am correct to assume that the more extreme and radical parties are 
better able to mobilize the group of dissatisfied voters, higher levels of dissatisfaction 
should be associated with an increased probability of support for such parties but lower 
probability of support for more moderate non-mainstream parties. This is so because the 
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more dissatisfied one is, the more likely that he will eschew a moderate party for an 
extreme one.  
 The last point, of course, applies only to those cases where at least one moderate 
and one extreme non-mainstream party are competing for votes. There is little doubt that 
there are more complex electoral dynamics taking place within each country, and that not 
all types of non-mainstream parties compete in the period characterized by third-
generation elections. For example, in the case of Czech Republic, from the non-
mainstream parties, only one radical left party (the Czech and Moravian Communist 
Party) and one extreme nationalist party (the Republican Party) were listed on the ballots 
for the third-generation elections. So, from the non-mainstream bloc, only these two 
types of parties competed for the vote of the dissatisfied democrats. In contrast, in 
Slovakia, all four types of non-mainstream parties were present in this generation of 
elections. That said, in all but two countries (Czech Republic and Estonia),6 we had at 
least one extreme or radical party and one more moderate non-mainstream party running 
in the third-generation elections, likely generating the zero-sum dynamics I discussed 
above. 
 I now turn to the statistical model and the data I use for the main analysis.  
3. Data and method 
 The countries covered in the main analysis are the ten post-communist countries 
that are member of the European Union (EU)—Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. The main reason 
for selecting this group of East European countries is data availability. I rely on special 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6 In Estonia, only new/centrist and national populist parties showed up in ballots in the third-generation 
elections. No radical left or extreme nationalist parties were present. 
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Eurobarometer surveys for Eastern Europe because they cover the largest number of post-
communist countries for the longest time. The Eurobarometer surveys have been 
consistently conducted in the ten countries starting in the early 1990s. Since voting 
intention and satisfaction with democracy are the main variables of interest, I retained all 
those surveys that had at least these two variables. The total number of surveys analyzed 
is 80, covering the time period from 1992 to 2004, with a gap between 1997 and 2002 
and the year 1993.7 The initial surveys come from the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer 
(CEEB) survey series that were carried out between 1990 and 1997. The remaining 
surveys come the Candidate Countries Eurobarometer (CC-EB) series that were 
conducted in countries that were applying for European Union membership starting in 
2001. Eight of the ten countries analyzed became members of the EU in 2004, with 
Bulgaria and Romania following in 2007, so all of them became part of the standard 
Eurobarometer surveys in 2005. However, the question about vote intention was not 
asked in the surveys after 2004. To test whether the findings hold in the period after 
2004, I use six additional surveys from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 
(CSES) conducted between 2005 and 2011 during election times. Only a subset of 
elections from five countries is covered by the CSES surveys in this period: Czech 
Republic, 2006; Estonia, 2011; Poland, 2005 and 2007; Slovakia, 2010; and Slovenia, 
2008.   
 The surveys analyzed provide an excellent coverage of the second and third 
generation elections, and allow us to test for temporal dynamics in support for non-
mainstream parties. Since we have strong reasons to believe that there is causal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7 With the exception of 2003, when two surveys with the variables of interest were conducted, all the other 
7 years (1992, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 2002, 2004) had only one eligible survey per year.  
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heterogeneity at play (i.e. different causal stories in the second- and third-generation 
elections), pooling the data for the entire period is inappropriate. I therefore divide the 
Eurobarometer surveys in two groups, corresponding to the second and third generation 
of elections. The CSES surveys covering the period between 2005 and 2012 are in a 
separate analysis, which examines whether the third-generation dynamics become stable 
over time (see Table 3.2, Table 3.3 and Table 3.4). It is important to note that it is 
difficult to make a sharp distinction between the different generations of elections in the 
way the survey data is structured. Specifically, since I focus on the sustained support for 
non-mainstream parties and not the election outcomes, it is impossible to draw a clear 
‘generational’ line of support for such parties in the years in which there are no elections 
but we have data on support for parties. However, given the break in the survey data 
between 1997 and 2002, I use surveys conducted after 2002 as roughly belonging to the 
third generation. Incidentally, all the third-generation elections in my sample of countries 
start on or after 1997, further justifying my approach.  
 As for the dependent variable, or rather the dependent variables, I have 
constructed dichotomous variables to reflect vote intention for the four different types of 
non-mainstream parties.8 For the CSES surveys, which were conducted shortly after 
actual elections had taken place, the respondents were asked to indicate which party, if 
any, they had voted for in that election. I have also constructed a separate dependent 
variable for those who indicated that they would not vote if elections were to be held, or, 
in the case of the CSES surveys, for those who did not vote in actual elections. Finally, I 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8 It is important keep in mind that questions about vote intention asked respondents to indicate which party 
they would vote if elections were to be held tomorrow or at some other point. The exact wording of the 
questions is:  If there were a General Election tomorrow, which party would you vote for, or might you be 
inclined to vote for?   
	   108	  
have constructed a variable for the respondents that supported the largest mainstream 
opposition party at the time when the survey was conducted.  
 It is important to note that, in 2004, with the exception of Bulgaria and Romania, 
which were not part of the EU yet, the vote intention question referred to the European 
parliament (EP) elections.9 While there is literature about the second order nature of EP 
elections in Western Europe, it is difficult to see how East Europeans would vote 
differently if elections were held for national parliaments as opposed for the European 
Parliament at this time point.  In 2004, the eight Eastern European countries that joined 
the EU, were newcomers to EP elections and it is reasonable to assume that there would 
be no second-order voting dynamics taking place.  
 The main independent variable is dissatisfaction with democracy. The actual 
wording of the survey questions in both the Eurobarometer and the CSES is the 
following: On the whole, are you, not at all satisfied, not very satisfied, fairly satisfied, or 
very satisfied with the way democracy works in (our country)? This variable was recoded 
so higher values indicate more dissatisfaction with democracy. From the individual level 
variables Age is a categorical variable with five categories or age cohorts, with higher 
values indicating older cohorts.10 Similarly, education is a categorical variable with four 
categories, where higher values indicate more education. I have recoded the Education 
variable to account for the different coding criteria used until 1997 and after 2002. The 
four categories are: Primary or less; Secondary uncompleted: Secondary completed; 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  The questions read: And which party would you be most likely to vote for at the European elections, 
(under 18= if you could vote at the EP elections)? 
 10	  For the male variable, females are the base category. In the CSES surveys, the age variable corresponds 
to the actual years of age, and education is on a slightly different scale but higher values indicate more 
education.  
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Higher Education/ University/ College. Some of the coding did not correspond perfectly, 
but all efforts were made so higher values indicate more education. Students were 
excluded from the analysis.  
 I encountered similar problems with coding incongruities when coding the 
financial outlook variable. For the period between 1990-2002, the surveys asked a 
question about the financial outlook for the next year. Specifically, the questions asked: 
And over the next 12 months, do you expect that the financial situation of your household 
will…Get a lot better, Get a little better, stay the same, Get a little worse, or Get a lot 
worse. However, this question was not asked in the surveys after 2002. Instead, the 
surveys asked a more general question about the personal situation in the next five 
years—In the course of the next five years, do you expect your personal situation to 
improve, to stay about the same or to get worse? Presumably, both of these questions tap 
into the financial outlook that individuals have for the foreseeable future, and the answer 
that respondents would give would not differ systematically.11 I therefore recode the 
financial outlook variable with only three categories—worse, same, and better—by 
collapsing the Get a lot better, Get a little better into a “better” category, and the Get a 
little worse, or Get a lot worse in a general “worse category.” While this in not a perfect 
solution to the coding incongruities inherent in the surveys, it provides a somewhat 
comparable measure for the future financial outlook of the respondents.   
 The data for the economic variables come mainly from World Bank’s World 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  The CSES surveys did not have an item measuring financial outlook. Instead, I rely on an indicator of 
income, which categorizes the respondents on a scale from 1-5, where 1 is the lowest household income 
quintile and 5 is the highest quintile. The two indicators tap into the egocentric economic situation of the 
respondents. 	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Development Indicators.12 I use indicators for GDP growth (annual %), unemployment,13 
and inflation.14 The data on income inequality is obtained from the Standardized World 
Income Inequality Database (SWIID) constructed by Solt (2009). In the SWIID dataset 
the Gini index has a theoretical range from 0, which indicates perfect equality and 100, 
which indicates one single individual receives the entire income while the rest get 
nothing.15	  For the disproportionality of the electoral system, I relied on the Gallagher 
index of disproportionality, which is available in Armingeon & Careja’s (2004) 
Comparative Data Set for 28 Post-Communist Countries 1989–2004.16 Finally, to 
calculate the vote percentages gained by non-mainstream parties over time, I use electoral 
data from the European Election Database.  
 Since I model the effects of individual and contextual factors on voter choice, I 
use multilevel models with two levels of analysis. Furthermore, given the dichotomous 
dependent variables, I use logistic regressions.  It is important to note that given the time 
dimension of the data, I have nested individuals in time and in countries. This nesting is 
particularly appropriate because, as already discussed, there are gaps in the years when 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  For easier interpretation, all the continuous, country-level variables have been centered on their mean.  
 13 The World Bank (WB) defines unemployment as the share of the labor force that is without work but 
available for and seeking employment. Whenever necessary, I relied on the IMF World Economic Outlook 
Database to supplement the data.  
 14 Measured by the annual growth rate of the GDP implicit deflator. The GDP implicit deflator is the ratio 
of GDP in current local currency to GDP in constant local currency. See 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.DEFL.KD.ZG for more information.  
 15 It is important to note that in order to increase the coverage across countries and over time, Solt (2009) 
uses a custom missing-data algorithm to standardize the United Nations University’s World Income 
Inequality Database, where data collected by the Luxembourg Income Study served as the standard. 
 16 For more information on the construction of this variable see (Lijphart 1999: 158). Since the 
disproportionality of electoral outcomes is only measured at the completion of each election, I interpolated 
the data for years between elections. 
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the surveys were conducted, so a cross-classification of individuals by time and countries 
is not appropriate (Arzheimer, 2009). Below are the regression results.   
4. Results 
 Before I discuss the regression results, I present time series graphs of the actual 
vote share of non-mainstream parties over time to get a feel of the temporal variation in 
support for such parties. In Figure 3.2, I have calculated the percent of the total vote that 
the four types of non-mainstream parties received in different five-year periods.17 Figure 
3.3 is more faithful to the theoretical categorization of elections and thus presents the 
vote share of non-mainstream parties for the three generations of elections. Figure 3.2 
and Figure 3.3 are striking in two ways. First, regardless of how we break it down, there 
is a discernable stability in the vote share garnered by radical left, extreme nationalist, 
and nationalist populist parties over time. On average, such parties have not become more 
popular since the beginning of the transition. Second, there is a clear increase in the vote 
share of new/centrist populist parties over time. As we can see from Figure 3.3, there has 
been a remarkable rise in the support of such parties in the third-generation of elections. 
Such parties are leader-based, they adopt anti-establishment discourse and sidestep 
ideology altogether. But, most importantly for liberal democracy, such parties are 
moderate and have taken centrist positions on European integrations and other key issues.  
 Thus, the time-series data presented in Figures 3.2 and 3.3 support an important 
and optimistic conclusion about support for non-mainstream parties in the last two 
decades: voters in Eastern Europe have not been electing progressively more extreme 
parties. But, who votes for the different non-mainstream parties? Is dissatisfaction with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  Yearly data are not appropriate because of the different schedule of elections in different countries.	  
	   112	  
the political system systematically related to support for any such party? To answer these 
questions, I now turn to multilevel regressions. 
4.1 Political dissatisfaction and support for non-mainstream parties 
 The statistical results are reported in Tables 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4. Table 3.2 presents 
the results of the period from 1992 to 1997, which roughly corresponds to the second 
generation of elections, and Table 3.3 presents the results from the analysis that uses data 
only from the period between 2002 and 2004, which corresponds to the third generation 
of elections. Table 3.4 presents the results of the period between 2005 and 2012.  
 The tables suggest a number of interesting results. First, there is no consistent 
positive relationship between political dissatisfaction and support for any of the non-
mainstream parties during the second-generation elections (Table 3.2). If anything, as 
models 1-5 of Table 3.2 suggest, the coefficient for the variable dissatisfaction with 
democracy is negative and statistically significant for the combined support of non-
mainstream parties, suggesting that more dissatisfied respondents might have actually 
eschewed such parties during the second-generation elections. So, the results provide no 
support for the hypothesis that non-mainstream parties, as a group, benefited from the 
protest vote of the dissatisfied democrats during the second-generation elections.  
However, on average, the largest mainstream opposition parties were more likely to 
benefit from dissatisfied voters during the second-generation than during the third-
generation elections, thus supporting Pop-Eleches’s (2010) argument about this effect. As 
model 7 in Tables 3.2 and 3.3 show, the coefficient measuring the effect of the 
dissatisfaction variable on support for the largest mainstream opposition party is positive 
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and statistically significant in the second-generation period, but statistically insignificant 
in the third generation period.  
 To summarize, it is clear that, controlling for other factors, dissatisfied democrats 
were more likely to support the main opposition party in any given country during the 
second-generation elections. Once they had tried mainstream parties of all stripes, 
however, dissatisfied citizens turned to some non-mainstream parties but not all of them. 
This begs the question of which non-mainstream parties were able to tap into this 
dissatisfaction during the third-generation elections. 
 The regression results provide a rather clear answer to this question. As models 1 
and 2 of Table 3.3 show, dissatisfaction with democracy is strongly associated with 
support for radical left and extreme nationalist parties. The substantive effect of the 
dissatisfaction variable is relatively large for the support of both of these types of parties. 
Specifically, controlling for all other variables, a one-unit increase in the dissatisfaction 
variable is associated with up to 9 percent increase in the probability of support for 
extreme nationalist parties and a 6 percent increase in the probability of support for 
radical left parties.18  Support for new/centrist populist and national populist parties, on 
the other hand, is negatively associated with higher dissatisfaction, though the substantive 
effect is small (see models 3 and 4 of Table 3.3). Controlling for all other effects, a one-
unit increase in dissatisfaction corresponds to about 3 percent lower probability for 
supporting new/centrist parties and 2.5 percent lower probability for supporting national 
populist parties.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  It is important to keep in mind that the dissatisfaction variable is measured on a 4-point 
scale.  
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 These results suggest that not only have the more radical and extreme parties 
tapped into the dissatisfied pool of voters, they have done so at the expense of other non-
mainstream parties. This supports one of the main arguments of this article that non-
mainstream parties compete with one another for the support of the dissatisfied citizens 
and that extreme parties have been more successful at harnessing the electoral potential 
of such voters.  
 It is important to note that dissatisfaction with the working of democracy is most 
strongly associated with a withdrawal from the political process. As model 6 of Table 3.2 
and 3.3 show, a one-unit increase in the dissatisfied variable is associated with as much 
as 10 percent lower probability of voting. This substantive effect is about the same in the 
second- and third-generation elections, suggesting that a sizable group of dissatisfied 
voters exit the political process.  
 As for the macrolevel determinants of the combined support for all non-
mainstream parties, the results are inconsistent and vary wildly between the second- and 
third-generation of elections. However, if we focus on the third generation (Table 3.3, 
model 5), when non-mainstream parties received the most support, the results are in line 
with our theoretical predictions. In fact, all the contextual variables have the expected 
signs and are statistically significant. As we can see from model 5 of Table 3.3, support 
for non-mainstream parties is associated with higher inflation, higher income inequality, 
higher unemployment, and lower economic growth. This is consistent with findings from 
other studies. For example, scholars have shown that while economic issues did not play 
a major role in determining voting patterns in Slovakia in the 1990s, they did play a much 
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more important role in the 2000s, when the issue of national identity had lost some its 
traction (Deegan-Krause, 2006). 
 So, while Pop-Eleches (2010) finds no consistent relationship between support for 
non-mainstream parties and economic indicators, my analysis strongly suggests that 
worse macroeconomic conditions result in higher support for non-mainstream parties as a 
group in the third-generation elections. One plausible reason for Pop-Eleches’s results is 
his approach of combining electoral results from both generations of elections in one 
statistical model, thus diluting the effect of macroeconomic variables during the third 
generation. Finally, as previous research has indicated, higher levels of disproportionality 
in electoral outcome are associated with lower support for non-mainstream parties. 
 One might wonder whether the voting behavior of dissatisfied citizens has 
changed since the mid 2000s. A crucial empirical question is whether the “revolving 
discontent” we observe between the second- and third-generation elections continues on 
or whether we see ”normalization” in the voting behavior of dissatisfied citizens, such 
that more dissatisfied voters stick with more extreme parties (e.g. Western Europe). A 
preliminary answer to this question is provided by the regression results in Table 3.4.19 
Using surveys from a subset of five countries and six elections that were held between 
2005 and 2012, the results strongly suggest that extreme right and radical left parties 
continue to receive the vote of the dissatisfied voters (Model 1), while new/centrist 
populist and nationalist populist parties do not benefit from more dissatisfaction (Model 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  It should be noted that, although the Table 4 presents only the results for the individual levels variables, I 
used mutlilevel modeling to calculate the effects. However, since the number of second-level groups is very 
small (only 6), the country-level effects cannot be interpreted reliably. That said, the multilevel modeling 
choice is appropriate because it does not assume that all the individual respondents are independent of one 
another and thus it takes into account the clustered nature of the data.	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2).20 To be more specific, controlling for all other variables, a one-unit increase in the 
Dissatisfaction variable is associated with about 9% increased probability of vote for an 
extreme right or radical left party. Dissatisfaction is negatively related to voting for 
centrist populist and nationalist populist parties, but this effect is not statistically 
significant.  
 Consistent with findings form Table 3.2 and 3.3, the largest substantive effect of 
the Dissatisfaction variable is on the probability of not voting. Strikingly, a one-unit 
increase in the Dissatisfaction variable is associated with about 10% higher probability of 
abstaining from voting (Model 3), which is almost exactly the same substantive effect we 
observe using completely different surveys from different time periods (i.e. 
Eurobarometer surveys for 1992-2004). From the rest of the individual variables, males 
are more likely to vote for extreme parties than are females, but there are no discernable 
differences between the two sexes when it comes to voting for populist parties. This 
result is consistent with the results in Table 3.3. Similarly, older people are more likely to 
vote for all four types of non-mainstream parties than younger people. Higher levels of 
education are associated with an increased probability of voting for populist parties, but 
the effect is substantively small. Individuals coming from wealthier households are less 
likely to vote for extreme parties, and this effect is statistically significant. The effect of 
income is not statistically significant for voting for populist parties. 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  For theoretical reasons and for easier presentation of results, I group the extreme parties in one group and 
and the populist parties in a separate one.	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5. Conclusion 
 This has paper has shed light on the political behavior of dissatisfied citizens in 
Eastern Europe. The analysis suggests that while such citizens tended to support 
mainstream opposition parties in second-generation elections, in third-generation 
elections dissatisfied voters were a boon for non-mainstream parties. However, not all of 
them benefited equally. Given the competition for the dissatisfied voter among non-
mainstream parties, the ones with more radical stances (i.e. the extreme nationalist and 
the radical left) were better positioned to attract such voters. Their ability to mobilize 
outraged citizens probably has a lot to do with the emotional appeal of more radical or 
extreme parties. Virulent nationalism and scapegoating of minorities in the case of the 
extreme nationalist parties, and anti-capitalist rhetoric in the case of the radical left, seem 
to have appealed the most to dissatisfied citizens.  
 If I am right that more dissatisfied voters are likely to support extreme parties, an 
increase in the number of those who have a more positive outlook on how democracy 
works should undercut the support of such extreme parties and should benefit parties with 
more moderate platforms, including personality based centrist parties. The opposite is 
true as well—an increase in the dissatisfaction with the performance of the political 
system should lead to more support for extreme parties. Given the great recession that 
began in 2007 in Europe, there has been an increase in dissatisfaction with democracy in 
the entire continent. We have already seen signs of extreme nationalist parties emerging 
in parts of Europe hit hard by the crisis (e.g. Greece). In Eastern Europe, perhaps the 
most striking example of such a phenomenon is the rapid rise of the ultra-nationalist 
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Hungarian Jobbik party, which went from 2% of the total vote in 2006 to more than 16% 
of the vote in the most recent 2010 parliamentary elections.   
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Tables and figures 
 
Table 3.1: Overview Of Non-Mainstream Parties In Eastern Europe 
 
Country Party Name Party Type Elec t ions 
Bulgaria Bulgarian Business Bloc (BBB) 
National Movement Simeon II (NDSV) 
new/centrist populist 
new/centrist populist 
1991-97 
2001 
Czech 
Republic 
Czech and Moravian Communist Party 
(KSCM) 
Republic Party (RSC- RPR) 
radical left 
 
extreme nationalist 
1990-2006 
 
1990-2002 
Estonia Committee for Defense of Soviet Power 
Communist Party Free Estonia Bloc 
Right Wingers’ Party (VKR)  
Estonian National Independent 
Party (ERSP) 
Estonian Center Party (K)  
Estonian Country People’s Party 
(EME/ER)  
Res Publica (RP) 
radical left 
radical left 
national populist 
national populist 
 
new/centrist populist 
national populist 
 
new/centrist populist 
1990 
1990 
1995 
1992 
 
1992-2003 
1999-2003 
 
2003 
Hungary Hungarian Justice and Life (MIEP)  
Independent Smallholders (FKGP)  
Hungarian Socialist Workers’ 
Party (MSzMP) 
Workers’ Party (MP) 
Hungarian Communist Workers’ Party 
(MKMP) 
Jobbik 
extreme nationalist 
national populist 
radical left 
 
radical left 
radical left 
 
extreme nationalist 
1994–2006 
1990–2002 
1990 
 
1994-2002 
2006 
 
2006 
Latvia Interfront  
Fatherland and Freedom (TB)  
Latvian National Conservative Party 
(LNNK) 
Pop Movement for Latvia (TKL-ZP)  
Latvian Unity Party (LVP)  
Popular Harmony Party (TSP)  
 
Latvian Socialist Party (LSP)  
For Human Rights in United Latvia 
(PCTVL) 
People’s Party (TP)  
New Party (JP)  
New Era Party (JL) 
radical left 
national populist 
national populist  
 
extreme nationalist  
radical left  
radical left  
 
radical left  
radical left  
 
new/centrist populist  
new/centrist populist  
new/centrist populist 
1990 
1993–2006 
1993–95 
 
1993–95 
1993–98 
1993–1998, 
2006 
1993–95 
2002–6 
 
1998 
1998 
2002 
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Lithuania Independent Lithuanian  
Communist Party 
Communist Party (SFSU)  
Lithuanian National Union (LTS)  
Lithuanian National Party/Young  
Lithuanians (LNP/JL) 
New Union (NS)  
Lithuanian Liberal Union (LLS)  
Order and Justice (TT)  
Labor Party (DP)  
radical left 
 
radical left  
national populist  
extreme nationalist  
 
new/centrist populist  
new/centrist populist 
national populist 
new/centrist populist  
1990 
 
1990 
1992–96 
1996–2000 
 
2000 
2000 
2004 
2004 
Poland Confederation Independent Poland  
(KPN) 
Christian National Union (ZChN)  
Realpolitik Union (UPR)  
Law and Justice (PiS) 
Law and Justice (PiS)  
Self Defense (SRP)  
Movement for Reconstruction of  
Poland (ROP) 
League of Polish Families (LRP)  
extreme nationalist  
 
national populist  
extreme nationalist  
new/centrist populist  
national populist  
radical left  
national populist  
 
national populist  
1991–93 
 
1991–93 
1991–97 
2001 
2005 
1993–2005 
1997 
 
2001–5 
Romania Greater Romania Party (PRM)  
Romanian National Unity Party 
(PUNR) 
Socialist Labor Party (PSM)  
New Generation Party (PNG) 
  
extreme nationalist  
national populist 
 
radical left  
new/centrist populist  
1992–2004 
1992–2000 
 
1992–2000 
2004 
Slovakia Movment for Demcratic Slovakia  
(HZDS) 
Movement for Democracy (HZD)  
Slovak National Party (SNS) 
Right Slovak National Party (PSNS)  
Association of Workers’ (ZRS)  
Slovak Communist Party (KSS)  
Party of Civic Understanding (SOP) 
Direction—Social Democracy  
(SMER) 
Alliance of New Citizens (ANO)  
national populist  
 
national populist  
extreme nationalist  
extreme nationalist  
radical left  
radical left  
new/centrist populist  
new/centrist populist 
 
new/centrist populist  
1992–2006 
 
2002 
1990–2006 
2002 
1994–98 
1990–2006 
1998 
2002 
 
2002 
Slovenia Slovenian National Party (SNS)  
New Slovenia (NSI) 
extreme nationalist  
new/centrist populist  
1992–2004 
2000 
SOURCE: Pop-Eleches (2010) 	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Table 3.2: Regression results from second-generation elections  (1992-1997) 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
 
Radical 
Left 
Extreme 
Nationalist 
Centrist 
Populists 
Nationalist 
Populist 
Non-
mainstream 
Parties 
No Vote 
Largest 
Mainstream 
Opposition 
Party 
(Intercept) -8.678*** -5.946*** 
  
17.417*** -5.754*** -2.963*** -5.132*** -4.505*** 
 (1.786) (0.884) (4.764) (1.690) (0.579) (1.201) (0.982) 
Dissatisfaction: 
Democracy -0.074 -0.035 -0.005 -0.206*** -0.139*** 0.391*** 0.188*** 
 (0.049) (0.052) (0.088) (0.039) (0.027) (0.032) (0.034) 
Male 0.239*** 0.379*** 0.205 0.169** 0.248*** -0.109* 0.112* 
 (0.071) (0.074) (0.121) (0.056) (0.038) (0.044) (0.047) 
Age 0.271*** -0.126*** -0.070 0.195*** 0.132*** -0.153*** 0.037 
 (0.031) (0.035) (0.057) (0.025) (0.017) (0.020) (0.021) 
Education 0.034 0.152*** 0.397*** -0.056 0.055** -0.070** 0.174*** 
 (0.035) (0.039) (0.076) (0.029) (0.020) (0.023) (0.025) 
Financial Outlook -0.011 0.002 -0.141 -0.079* -0.061* 0.194*** 0.080* 
 (0.050) (0.051) (0.083) (0.040) (0.027) (0.031) (0.032) 
Growth 0.153*** 0.175*** 0.013 -0.280*** -0.092*** 0.046** -0.058*** 
 (0.034) (0.041) (0.026) (0.026) (0.012) (0.017) (0.015) 
Unemployment -0.054 -0.145*** -0.701*** 0.047*** -0.011 -0.121*** -0.080*** 
 (0.028) (0.030) (0.117) (0.013) (0.010) (0.034) (0.020) 
Income inequality -0.138* -0.624*** 1.655* -0.442*** -0.314*** 0.032 -0.123** 
 (0.066) (0.078) (0.771) (0.041) (0.025) (0.056) (0.039) 
Inflation 0.009** -0.002 0.098* -0.014*** -0.004*** 0.007*** -0.009*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.039) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Disproportionality -0.164 0.450*** 0.884* 0.449*** 0.253*** -0.088* -0.587*** 
 (0.104) (0.053) (0.415) (0.047) (0.023) (0.044) (0.037) 
N 40        
n 29318        
Signif. codes: ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05  
Standard errors in brackets 
SOURCE: Eurobarometer 
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Table 3.3: Regression results from third-generation elections (2002-2004) 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
 
Radical 
Left 
Extreme 
Nationalist 
Centrist 
Populists 
Nationalist 
Populist 
Non-
mainstream 
Parties 
No Vote 
Largest 
Mainstream 
Opposition 
Party 
(Intercept) 3.243 -10.324* -2.695 -12.754* 1.956 -2.251* -2.782** 
 (5.273) (5.042) (2.369) (5.970) (1.339) (0.885) (0.999) 
Dissatisfaction: 
Democracy 0.242*** 0.350*** -0.139*** -0.099* 0.032 0.380*** 0.025 
 (0.033) (0.061) (0.027) (0.046) (0.020) (0.021) (0.025) 
Male 0.155** 0.629*** -0.011 -0.103 0.092** -0.064* 0.198*** 
 (0.047) (0.088) (0.039) (0.067) (0.028) (0.031) (0.035) 
Age 0.214*** -0.164*** 0.030 0.117*** 0.096*** 0.136*** -0.075*** 
 (0.021) (0.038) (0.017) (0.029) (0.013) (0.014) (0.016) 
Education 0.126*** -0.049 0.122*** -0.081* -0.004 0.164*** 0.119*** 
 (0.024) (0.046) (0.020) (0.034) (0.014) (0.016) (0.018) 
Financial Outlook 0.008 -0.169** 0.152*** 0.018 0.066** 0.277*** -0.018 
 (0.035) (0.060) (0.029) (0.048) (0.021) (0.022) (0.026) 
Growth 0.176 0.069 -0.557*** -0.407 -0.098* -0.025 0.070 
 (0.112) (0.222) (0.077) (0.235) (0.038) (0.032) (0.038) 
Unemployment 0.274 -0.188 0.267*** 0.253 0.176*** 0.001 -0.109*** 
 (0.209) (0.204) (0.054) (0.172) (0.038) (0.022) (0.027) 
Income inequality 0.289 -0.670 1.342*** 0.722* 0.155* -0.005 -0.067 
 (0.237) (0.504) (0.186) (0.358) (0.078) (0.036) (0.042) 
Inflation 0.307*** -0.026 0.053 -0.121 0.086** -0.018 -0.007 
 (0.093) (0.092) (0.039) (0.129) (0.026) (0.018) (0.020) 
Disproportionality 0.406 -0.339 -0.567*** -0.076 -0.242** 0.024 0.144* 
 (0.293) (0.402) (0.110) (0.183) (0.075) (0.058) (0.068) 
N 40       
n 33794       
Signif. codes: ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05  
Standard errors in brackets 
SOURCE: Eurobarometer 
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Table 3.4: Regression results (2005-2011) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  
Extreme Right 
and Radical 
left 
Centrist Populist 
and Nationalist 
Populist No Vote 
    
Dissatisfaction: 
Democracy 0.347*** -0.019 0.403*** 
 -0.085 -0.049 -0.041 
Male 0.396** 0.078 -0.147* 
 -0.128 -0.073 -0.061 
Age 0.022*** 0.019*** -0.026*** 
 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 
Education -0.078 0.064** -0.283*** 
 -0.048 -0.024 -0.023 
Income -0.178*** -0.007 -0.152*** 
 -0.051 -0.028 -0.023 
Constant -3.323 -7.766*** 0.152 
 -2.143 -1.592 -0.213 
        
N 6 6 6 
n 6,388 6,388 6,388 
Signif. Codes:  ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05  
Standard errors in brackets 
SOURCE: CSES 
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Figure 3.1 
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Figure 3.2 
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Figure 3.3 
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